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INTRODUCTION

I was just conscious, vaguely, of being on the track of a law, a
law that would fit, that would strike me as governing the delicate
phenomena-delicate though so marked-that my imagination
found itself playing with. A part of the amusement they yielded
came, I daresay, from my exaggerating them-grouping them into
a larger mystery (and thereby a larger 'law') than the facts, as
observed, yet warranted; but that is the common fault of minds for
which the vision of life is an obsession.
Henry James, The Sacred Fount
The Contracting Parties hereby express their resolve to
their effort to create, with a view to a more just and
international economic order, a model for relations
developed and developing states and to work together to
the international context the principles underlying their
tion.

intensify
balanced
between
affirm in
coopera-

Support shall be provided in ACP/EEC cooperation for the ACP
States' effort to achieve comprehensive self-reliant and selfsustained development based on their cultural and social values,
their human capacities, their natural resources and their economic
potential in order to promote the ... well-being of their populations through the satisfaction of their basic needs....
Cooperation shall be directed towards development centered on
man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development....
Fourth ACP/EEC Convention of Lome'

1.
Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990) ("Lomd IV"), reprintedfrom the text appearing
in The Courier, No. 120, March-April 1990. These excerpts are from arts. 1, 4, and 5 of Lom6
IV.
As implied by its name, Lomr IV is the fourth in a series of agreements between the EEC and
ACP countries. The others are: ACP/EEC Convention of Lom6, Feb. 28, 1975, 19 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 25) 2 (1976), 14 I.L.M. 604 (1975) ("Lo=6 I"); Second ACP/EEC Convention
of Lomd, Oct. 31, 1979, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 347) 2 (1980), 19 I.L.M. 327
(1980)("Lom6 II"); and, Third ACP/EEC Convention of Lom6, Dec. 8, 1984, 24 I.L.M. 588
(1985) ("Lomd III-).
As indicated below, Lom6 IV has sixty-nine signatory ACP states. Lom6 I was signed by
forty-six ACP states. Simmonds, The Lomd Convention and the New International Economic
Order, 13 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 315 (1976) ("Simmonds I"). By the time LOME II was
executed, the number of ACP states had grown to fifty-eight. Simmonds, The Second Lome
Convention: The Innovative Features, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 415 (1980) ("Simmonds II").
Finally, LOME III was executed by representatives of sixty-five ACP countries. Simmonds, The
Third Lome Convention, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 389 (1985) ("Simmonds III").
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One may ask why an excerpt from the writing of Henry James, the
American novelist and critic, is making an appearance alongside selected
provisions of the Fourth ACP/EEC Convention of Lomd (Lomd IV). There
is, of course, a certain deliberateness in juxtaposing the two. I intend the
"delicate though so marked" phenomena in the James quotation to refer to
those myriad factors--described in Lomd IV as cultural, social, human,
environmental and economic-which in some as yet unscientific manner coalesce into "comprehensive self-reliant and self-sustained development" in the
South. As shall be shown, Lomd IV is part of an evolving attempt to weave
these factors together into a form of genuine North/South cooperation,
thereby achieving the "mystery" of a "more just and balanced international
economic order."
Moving, then, from the cryptic to the manifest, my thesis is this: The
African, Pacific, and Caribbean (ACP) countries2 are presently in serious
economic trouble and, despite the disappointing efforts of the countries
making up the European Economic Community (EEC or Community)3 and
What was observed in 1985 continues to be true: "[I]f capacity to attract participants is a
criterion of success, Lome has stood the test of time well .... " Boardman, Shaw & Soldatos,
Introduction, in EUROPE, AFRICA AND LOME III at 9 (Boardman, Shaw & Soldatos eds. 1985)
[hereinafter EUROPE, AFRICA, AND LOME III].

During its fifteen year history no signatory state has opted out of Lomd.
2.
For information on the origin of the ACP group, see Sy, The Birth of the ACP Group,
The Courier, No. 93, Sept.-Oct., 1985, at 52. For information on ACP organization, see
Dodoo, Structure and Functioning of the ACP Group, The Courier, No. 93, Sept.-Oct., 1985,
at 57.
The African ACP states (46 countries) are, in alphabetical order: Angola, Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
The Caribbean states (15 countries) are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Christopher and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The Pacific states (8 countries) are: Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands,
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.
The total population of the ACP states exceeds 439 million; the total population of the
Community states is in excess of 324.7 million. Taken together, the Community and the ACP
group represent about half the membership of the United Nations and account for over 14% of
the world's population. For brief outlines of these countries, see Profiles of the ACP States and
of the Member States of the European Community, The Courier, No. 120, March-April, 1990,
at 20.
3.
For a survey of the Community and its structure and institutions, see Yard, Promises,
Promises: A Critical Analysis of Lom lIrs Private Investment Provisions, 9 FORD. INT'L L.J.
634 n.3 (1986).
It should be noted that it is the Commission which negotiates treaties, subject to input and
approval of the Council of Ministers and the ratification of the European Parliament. Id. at 649,
n.99. In a very real sense, each renegotiation of Lom6 concerns "two separate and concurrent
sets of negotiations: those between the EEC and the ACP on the one hand, and those, possibly
more important, between the [EEC] Council and the Commission on the other." Stevens, The
Renegotiation of the Convention, in EUROPE, AFRICA, AND LOMIt III, supra note 1, at 68.
In terms of concessions to the ACP states, the Commission is often out in front of the Council
during these negotiations. For instance, Manuel Manin, Vice-President of the Commission and
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the Lomd process to assist them, the continued evolution of Lomd's "vision
of life" to meet "basic human needs" provides some hope for a qualitatively
different future. My examination of Lomd will show its far-reaching agenda
for assisting development in the (mostly African) ACP countries. Achieving

the goals of the Lomd accords remain more an ambition than a reality. Still,
at best-when viewed with imagination and in light of Lomd IV's expressed
aspirations-these accords may yet be regarded as laying "the track" to a
more equitable world system.
In particular this article will examine certain of the trade, aid, and finance
provisions of Lomd IV' and the earlier accords. The reader will find the
discussion presented here to be critical of the progress of Lomd mechanisms
in assisting ACP development objectives. Even the moral element behind the
EEC assistance cannot go unchallenged. 5 As in the lives of men and
women, so too in the policies of nations does self-interest often overshadow,
and too often masquerade as, moral imperative. He or she is urged,
however, to recognize that "[n]o study of law is adequate if it loses sight of
the fact that law operates first and last for, upon, and through individual

human beings."6 There is, one hopes, room for law which expresses
aspirations, as well as law which establishes instruments to achieve concrete
objectives. 7 An excessively instrumentalist approach and evaluation emphaCommissioner for Development, initially proposed a larger increase for Lom6 IV's financial
envelope than the majority of Member States were willing to accept. Council of European
Development Ministers, The Courier, No. 116, July-Aug., 1989, Yellow Pages at XIV. See
also infra note 255.
4.
Lom6 IV was signed in the Togolese capital of Lom6 on December 15, 1989. Unlike
its predecessors, which each lasted five years, except for its Financial Protocol Lom6 IV is for
a ten-year term. The longer term was specifically requested by the EEC to evidence the
durability of EEC-ACP relations. The Financial Protocol has been funded for five years and
is to be re-negotiated for the second half of Lom6 IV. See Development Finance Cooperation,
infra, Part Three.
5.
That there is a moral element to LomE IV should be obvious by this examination of
its provisions. Lorenzo Natali, upon his retirement as EEC Commission for Development,
remarked that he has "always followed the principle whereby development has a moral
dimension as well as an economic one." Lorenzo Natali Leaves the Commission, The Courier,
No. 113, Jan.-Feb., 1989, Yellow Pages at VI.
6.
C. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xxi (1976).
7.
This article, though taking as its subject a treaty and therefore referencing traditional
legal materials as a matter of course, also relies on scholarship and other sources not forming
a part of such materials. Some may argue that what results is not 'legal' scholarship. I have
See Matthews,
elsewhere answered this argument in the context of international law.
InternationalInequality: Some Global and Regional Perspectives, 7 WiS. INT'L L.J. 261 (1989),
particularly notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
Dean Robert Stein of the University of Minnesota Law School recently noted with
approval that "[liegal scholars and scholars in related disciplines increasingly are examining
broader issues of ethics and social justice and reconceptualizing entire areas of doctrinal
development." Stein, Essay: The Future of Legal Education, 75 MINN. L. REv. 945, 953

(1991).
Thus an interdisciplinary approach to law is becoming accepted within the academy. Scholars
utilizing such an approach have gained a new legitimacy from the success (and influence) of the
'law and economics' movement. See, e.g., Areeda, Always a Borrower: Law and other
Disciplines, 1988 DUKE L. J. 1029 (1988) and Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987 100 HARv. L. REv. 761 (1987).
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sizes the latter to the detriment of the former.
A sympathetic analysis of the convention would move beyond measuring
the effectiveness of Lomd's mechanisms for stimulating growth to its
aspirations for self-reliant development in the South and its contributions to
a re-thinking of North/South relations. Such an examination of Lomd IV will
show that, despite the disappointing economic performance to date of the
Lomd process, the agreement presents a qualitative improvement over past
and contemporary efforts to achieve these objectives.
Critics of Lomd have frequently and correctly called attention to
the fact that the relationship between the Haves and the Have-Nots
continues to be unequal, and the EEC states in the final analysis
still pursue their own national and collective interests. It would
be surprising if it were otherwise. The real issue, though, is
whether self-interest is, or can be, defined or redefined in such
ways as to increase justice and equity and to broadly encompass
a more reasonable vision of the world. It would be odd and
ahistorical if Lomd, or any other North-South convention, could
radically restructure a world and a system which took centuries to
construct."

With James, the reader may conclude that "[t]he facts, as observed" do not
warrant some of the more extravagant claims made for the Lom6 Conventions as a "larger 'law'" providing a solution to all ACP problems. Neither,
however, do they merit the frequent disparagement and occasional outright
condemnation of the Lom6 accords that sometimes appears in the literature. 9
Critics maintain that the Lomd process perpetuates the historic division of
labor, allocating the production of primary commodities to Africa and the
production of industrial goods to Europe. This analysis is perhaps accurate
as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. In particular, it begs the
questions of what would constitute better, more productive alternatives to
Lomd arrangements, and whether such alternatives currently exist.
In any event, Lom6 IV must not only be judged upon present performance,

8.
Gruhn, Lome Convention Renegotiations: Litmus Test for North-South Discussions,
in EUROPE, AFRICA AND LOM9 Ill, supra note 1, at 31.
9.
See, e.g., Dolan, The Lomi Convention and Europe's Relationship with the Third
World: A CriticalAnalysis, J. EUR. INTEGRATION 369 (1978); Vaitsos, From the Ugly American
to the Ugly European: The Role of Western Europe in North-South Relations, in THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 167 (H. Makler, A. Martinelli, & N. Smelser ed. 1982); Rajana,
The Lomd Convention: An Evaluation of EEC Economic Assistance to the ACP States, 20 J.
MOD. AFR. STUD. 179 (1982); Ravenhill, Europe and Africa: An Essential Continuity, in
EUROPE, AFRICA AND LOMl III, supra note 1, at 35.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

5

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1991], Art. 2

6

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

but also for its departures from the past and for its promise for the future. 10

Certain features of Lomd, such as its emphasis on self-reliant development
in the South, its joint North/South institutions, and the highly concessional
terms of its aid, are unique and valuable examples of movement to a more
equitable world order. Such features must be contrasted with prior patterns
of relations between Europe and her former African colonies. These
relations, as shall be seen, have evolved from an exploitative policy of
colonialism to a credible attempt by the Europeans to render development
assistance which is sensitive to both the needs and the aspirations of ACP
populations. Lomd IV also compares favorably to contemporaneous
North/South interactions, where multilateral and bilateral interactions have,
to say the least, been less sensitive to these factors.
Part One of this article begins with the contemporary period and examines
the current economic status of much of the South in general, and SubSaharan Africa, in particular. An introduction to the process of structural
adjustment (underway in most of the countries in the region) is included.
Two competing theoretical schools of thought concerning the causes of
underdevelopment in the peripheral countries of the South are then presented.
Part Two sets out a brief review of the history of European intervention in
Africa up to the post World-War II period, followed by the examination of
European/African relations dating from the establishment of the EEC in 1957
to the signing, in 1975, of the first Lom6 Convention in Lom6, Togo. Next
comes a short section contrasting Lom6 approaches with those of the
Caribbean Basin Initiative and other U.S. aid policies for development
assistance.
Part Three presents an overview of selected provisions of the various Lom6
accords over time. Performance to date of the specific Lomd development
mechanisms is evaluated. Great emphasis is also placed on those Lom6
policies and institutions which represent innovations in North/South cooperation. Particular importance is attached to the participatory and contractual
nature of EEC/ACP arrangements. This contrasts sharply with the unilateral
imposition of European military, economic, and political control in Africa
prior to 1975.
The article concludes by refocusing on the subject of structural adjustment,
comparing and contrasting the approach of the Bretton Woods institutions and
the prospects for the application of the new Lomd IV provisions addressing
10.
[A]ll the ACP governments would refute ... allegations of neo-colonialism.
The EEC is often condemned by those who believe that an unsullied relationship [i.e. one not tinged by neo-colonialism] between Africa and Europe could be
created given sufficient good will by all the parties concerned. But such an attitude
overlooks the general point that it is impossible to thrust the past away and make
a completely fresh start in international relations. At best, states can hope to take
the most positive aspects of the past and build on them.
C. COSGROVE & K. TWITCHETT, EUROPE AND AFRICA: FROM ASSOCIATION TO PARTNERSHIP

168 (1978).
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this issue.
PART ONE

Poverty in the South
The decade of the 1980s has been called the "lost decade" for international
development. 1 Given the acknowledged urgency, all persons of conscience
are called to consider the issues that Lomd IV and its predecessors were
designed to address; namely, how best to promote development in the South.
The cover of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's
(World Bank) most recent report on international development (subtitled
Poverty) is black in color with deliberately ominous graphics. 2 Nevertheless, the introduction to the report contains a relatively optimistic overview
of progress in the South:
During the past three decades the developing world has made
enormous economic progress. This can be seen most clearly in
the rising trend for incomes and consumption: between 1965 and
1985 consumption per capita in the developing world went up by
almost 70 percent. Broader measures of well-being confirm this
picture-life expectancy, child mortality, and educational attainment have all improved markedly. Viewed from either perspective-income and consumption on the one hand, broad social
indicators on the other-the developing countries are advancing
much faster than today's developed countries did at a comparable
stage. 11

The statistical data that the report contains, however, justify its cover and
paints a bleak picture of the outlook for the world's poorest nations. Its
authors estimate that, as of 1985, more than one billion people--at least a

11. The Paris Conference on the Least-Developed Countries, The Courier, No. 124, Nov.Dec., 1990, Yellow Pages at VIII. See also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1990: POVERTY iii (1990) [hereinafter WORLD BANK REPORT].
12. The situation described by the WORLD BANK REPORT is, of course, not new. See
generally Matthews, supra note 7, at 264 n.7. That article described South/South cooperation
which used the EEC as a point of departure for modeling Third World regional economic
integration regimes to foster national and regional development. This article examines the
EEC's role in the context of a North/South cooperative regime designed for like purposes.
13. WORMD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 1. In a document otherwise bristling with

statistics and references, it curiously cites no authority for this last proposition. Nevertheless,

even a well-known structurmlist theorist (the theory is discussed below) makes the same point.
C. CHASE-DUNN, GLOBAL FORMATION: STRUCTURES OF THE WORLD-ECONOMY 261-62 (1989).
See also Williams, Political and Social Problems of Development, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE
SAHARA, 1991 at 28 (20th ed. 1991) [hereinafter AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA].

Note also that the World Bank's use of language -"the developing countries are advancing
must faster than today's developed countries did at a comparable stage"--racks the "modemizationist" or "stages of growth" school. See infra note 34 accompanying text.
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quarter of the global population-were experiencing abject poverty,
"struggling to survive on less than $370 a year." 14 Moreover, thirteen"
of the thirty low-income countries for which data are available actually
experienced either a zero or overall negative rate of growth for the years
1965-1988.16
Aid and Developed Country Policies
The developed world has not altogether ignored the needs of developing
countries, increasing their development assistance from $6.4 billion in 1965
to $48.17 billion in 1988.17 The oil-producing' countries have likewise

14.

WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.

15. The countries (with populations in millions and per capita GNP for 1988) include: Sudan
(23.8, $480), Mauritania (1.9, $480), Ghana (14.0, $400), Central African Republic (2.9, $380),
Togo (3.4, $370), Niger (7.3, $300), Zambia (7.6, $290), Uganda (16.2, $280), Madagascar
(10.9, $190), Zaire (33.4, $170), Tanzania (24.7, $160), Chad (5.4, $160) and Ethiopia (47.7,
$120).
All are Sub-Saharan African countries. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 178.
Clearly this region accounts for a "highly disproportionate" number of the world's poor. id.
at 2.

16. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 178-79 (Table 1. Basic Indicators-all country
data in this footnote is taken from this source). The World Bank Report defines low-income
economies as those with a GNP per capita of $545 or less in 1988. Id. at x. By contrast, highincome economies are defined as those with a GNP per capita of $6,000 or more. Id. The
highest per capita income--$27,500 in 1988-was enjoyed by Switzerland. The United States
had a per capita income of $19,840 in 1988, placing it fourth on the list (also behind Norway
and Japan). Only two of the twelve countries in the EEC (Portugal and Greece) had per capita
incomes of less than $6,000 in 1988 ($3,650 and $4,800, respectively).
17. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 214 (Table 19. Official development assistance
from OECD & OPEC members).
Official development assistance (ODA) consists of net disbursements of loans and
grants made on concessional financial terms by official agencies of the members
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to promote economic development
and welfare.
Id. at 253.
While large in absolute terms, these financial transfers represent only about 0.45 percent of
total GDP of the OPEC countries and, alarmingly, only 0.09 percent of total GDP for the
OECD countries. Id. at 215.
"Collectively, EC countries are the largest providers of multilateral resources [to the South],
and account for over one-half of all concessionary transfers. They also account for around 42%
of the total OECD contribution to the International Development Association." Watkins, Africa
and the European Community: The Lorn Conventions, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, supra
note 13, at 51.
Specifically, Lom6 IV commitments represent 17% of EEC national aid budgets (the balance
goes either for bilateral aid or to other multilateral efforts). Id. at 39. This percentage has
increased with each successive convention.
Currently, 93% of Lom6 IV's funds are in the form of grants. According to EEC VicePresident Matin, this extremely large percentage makes Lom6 IV the most concessional
assistance currently available to ACP countries. Joint Committee in Port Moresby, The Courier,
No. 121, May-June, 1990, at III.
Additional statistical data on Lomd IV's financial arrangements, including dollar amounts, is

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol22/iss1/2

8

Matthews: Lomé IV and ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost Decade

1991]

LOMt IV AND

ACP/EEC RELATIONS

contributed to their poorer neighbors, with development assistance totalling
$2.4 billion in 1988 (down from a high of $9.6 billion in 1980).1s Given
the dismal figures contained in the World Bank's report and the realities
facing the world's poor, however, more must obviously be done.19
In recent years aid has represented only about 1.4 percent of
central government expenditures for DAC members (and only
about 0.8 percent for the United States). A substantial increase in
the resources for fighting poverty in the poorest countries appears
entirely affordable.'
The World Bank recommends that aid be tied to "support the kinds of
policies"2" that it views as reducing poverty. These frequently onerous
policies, discussed below in the sections on structural adjustment, represent
a significant change in development policies for most of Sub-Saharan Africa.
They were introduced into the Sub-Saharan African context by a 1982 World
Bank publication commonly known as the "Berg Report" after its author,
economist Eliot Berg.' The Berg Report, as a noted African economist
pointedly remarked, held out the "carrot of doubling foreign aid in real terms
in the 1980s" in order to make these principles acceptable.' Despite the
widespread adoption of structural adjustment policies, however, the increased
aid has not been forthcoming.'
The internal policies of developed countries also have a significant impact
on world povertyY Many developed countries have low rates of say-

set out below, particularly in the section entitled Development Finance Cooperation.
18. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 215.
19. See infra note 24.
20. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 136.
21. That is,structural adjustment policies (discussed below). See, e.g., Id. at 126, 134.
The Bank also points out that bilateral aid is frequently given for political, strategic, and
commercial, as opposed to humanitarian, reasons. This explains why per capita aid to Israel is
over twice that of Egypt, the next largest recipient, and about 100 times the aid per-capita to
India. Id. at 128.
Moreover, "[o]nly about 8 percent of the U.S. aid program in1986, for example, could be
identified as 'development assistance devoted to low-income countries.'" Id. at 127-28.
22. WORLD BANK REPORT, Accelerated Development in Sub-SaharanAfrica: An Agenda for
Action (1982) [hereinafter Berg Report].
23. See S. AMIN, MALDEVELOPMENT: ANATOMY OF A GLOBAL FAILURE 35 (1990).
24. Id. at 36.
[Wlhile Sub-Saharan Africa received $6,900m. in official development assistance
in 1980, $8,900m in 1987 and $14,552m. in 1988 (incurrent U.S. dollars), if
inflation were taken into account the amounts in real terms would actually have declined.
Watkins, supra note 17, at 33.
25. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 19.
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ings.
If these persist, developed countries will experience slower growth
and interest rates will remain high. Demand for the South's imports will
slacken and the South's debt service burden, where interest rates are
variable, will grow. High budget deficits also keep interest rates elevated
and decrease the potential for investment in the South.
Sub-SaharanAfrican Poverty and Development Strategies
Of the forty-nine countries classified by the World Bank as low-income,'
thirty-three are located in the Sub-Saharan Africa.' Indeed, Sub-Saharan
Africa has been deemed the "empty belly of the entire world."'
By virtually any economic or social indicator, Sub-Saharan Africa
generally performs less well than any other developing region..
. [and] has the lowest GDP growth rate, intake of daily calories
per caput, fewest doctors per caput and the lowest life expectancy. 3

What are the root causes of African underdevelopment? Why do the
conditions of underdevelopment persist? Only partial answers to such vexing
questions can be attempted here.
Addressing the second question first, national development has usually been
comprehended in roughly two contradictory ways: as a result of modernization (the mostly Northern "modernizationist group") or as a consequence of
the structure of the world economy (the mostly Southern "structuralist
group"). 3' While some brief and very general comments regarding each of
these theoretical schools follow, it is important to note that "there are
important differences within, as well as between, these groups." 32 A
summary presentation of the two views here will provide an illuminating
context to my subsequent examination of the Lomd process and Lom6 IV.
It is significant that these heretofore largely competing views are increas-

26. S. AMIN, supra note 23, at 19. See also WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 15.
27. The World Bank defines low-income countries as those countries with a GNP per capital
of $545 or less in 1988. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at x.

28. Id. at 178 and 243.
29.
30.

S. AMIN, supra note 23, at 148.
Sparks, Economic Trends in Africa, in AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, supra note 13,

at 31.
31. I have elsewhere examined these two broad schools of development theory: the
'structuralist' and 'modemizationist' (or 'stages of growth') schools. See Matthews, supra note

7, at 270-77. This portion of the article draws from that earlier study.
32. Id. at 270 n.19 and citations therein.
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ingly informing each other. 33 This is welcome since policy makers in the
two groups are no longer necessarily talking past one another. There is,
moreover, evidence that the Lom accords (and the EEC/ACP cooperation
they have engendered) both reflect and contribute to this relatively recent
development.
In general, the modernizationist group views development as proceeding
from economic growth in a relatively free and unregulated market.
Development is seen as a process of passing through common economic
stages from an agrarian toward an industrial economy.' Some countries
are more advanced in the process than others. Theorists of this group
maintain that laissezfaire market economy policies promote growth. They
regard such policies as universal, equally applicable to a wide variety of
countries.
National development has traditionally been measured statistically by the
modernizationists in terms of increases in a nation's gross domestic product
(GDP).3 5 Governments should encourage rapid industrialization through
domestic policy regimes that encourage manufactured exports. This will
result, they maintain, in growing wage labor in industry, thus contributing
to both domestic savings and demand and feeding further economic
growth.' The agricultural sector should also be export-oriented as a means
of earning the foreign exchange necessary to pay for the imported inputs for
the nascent export industry.
Emphasis is placed by modernization theorists on domestic policies which
foster foreign investment in order to attract additional capital and boost
production. Private economic actors should be given the widest possible
latitude to operate in the domestic economy. Taxes, tariffs, and the public
sector should be kept to a minimum, again to encourage trade, domestic
savings and consumption and to keep import prices down. The domestic
policy regime should, above all, focus on export promotion. Modernizationists point to the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia, such

33. See, e.g., Broad, Cavanagh & Belo, Development: The Market is not Enough, 81
FOREIGN POL. 144, 148-49 (Winter 1990-91). From their examination of development strategies
and experiences, the authors find "a more complex truth than that purveyed by free-market
ideologues: Command economies may propel societies through the first stages of development,
but further growth into a more sophisticated economy necessitates a greater role for market
mechanisms." Id.
Lom6 IV, in promoting trade while at the same time giving recognition for the need for food
security and sympathy for a strategy of state ownership for economies lacking a strong private
sector, seems sensitive to this truth.
34. The World Bank quotation appearing in the text accompanying, supra note 13, seems to
reflect this 'stages of growth' thinking.
35. See Matthews, supra note 7, at 271. See also I. ADELMAN & E. MORRIS, ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND SOCIAL EQUrITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 71, 72 (1976); and J. COCKCROFT,
A. FRANK & D. JOHNSON, DEPENDENCE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT:
LATIN AMERICAN
POLrrCAL ECONOMY at xv and introduction (1972).
36. See, e.g., J. SPERO, POLTICs OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 138-39 (1981).
Matthews, supra note 7, at 270.
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as South Korea and Taiwan,37 as evidence that policies promoting international trade do indeed foster development.
Much attention is also given to local elites; if elites adopt the values and
consumption patterns of the North, the general population will follow.

Economic and social reforms need to be deferred to the future when the
benefits of rapid industrialization and economic growth can be expected to
"trickle down" to the masses.

The structuralist group is, in many ways, a reaction to this focus on a
liberal domestic policy regime.3" Structuralists claim that it is incorrect to
suggest that countries in the South can follow the same path as did the
developed countries to achieve economic development. Indeed, they point
out that, contrary to the domestic policy prescriptions for a liberal and open
economy that certain theorists from the North have made for the South, both
South Korea and the United States were highly protective of the domestic

market during the formative years of their industrial development.39

The structuralists place much greater significance on the historical and

contextual role of the South in global trading patterns. The rapid industrialization of the North has resulted, they say, from a continuing process of
extraction of surplus value from the South. This process dates from the late

fifteenth century and continues up to the present via the 'theory of unequal

37. All is not rosy in these "miracle models of capitalist development." Broad, Cavanaugh
& Bello, supra note 33, at 144. As these authors point out,
South Korean labor force[s] erupted in thousands of strikes during the late 1980s,
undermining the very basis of that country's export success. Meanwhile, decades
of uncontrolled industrial development have left large parts of Taiwan's landscape
with poisoned soil and toxic water.
Excessive confidence in free-market approaches melts when one examines the
mounting crises in the supposed success stories of South Korea and Taiwan.
Exciting alternatives to the [modernizationist] paradigms are emerging in the
hundreds of thousands of citizens' groups that flourish amid adversity and
repression in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Id. at 144, 162. As shall be seen below, Lon6 IV has a special emphasis on polycentric
development and popular participation.
38. Liberal domestic policies will be critiqued in our discussion on IMF/World Bank
structural adjustment later in the article. Structuralist theories have also been vehemently
criticized, and not just for the policy regimes they engender. One powerful criticism, acknowledged by a leading structuralist, points out that:
men and women are more than simply occupants of structural positions, merely
agents of social forces. They are historical actors who actively negotiate and
struggle to create their own lives and to change (or maintain) existing social
institutions. A structuralist theory is condemned because it implies a mechanical
view of human beings hopelessly caught and scuttled along by social forces beyond
their control . . . promot[ing] fatalism. Structural theories are themselves
ideological weapons by which power is legitimated, and this power is used to
oppress and exploit people.
C. CHASE-DUNN, supra note 13, at 298.
39. C. CHASE-DUNN, supra note 13, at 285.
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While
exchange' or, more familiarly, the 'declining terms of trade'.'
considerably more will be said regarding this, the theory is that, over time,
prices for the primary commodities produced in the South decline while
prices for the North's processed goods increase. The North is able to
demand more of the South's resources for static amounts of its processed
goods and technology. In this fashion a net transfer of wealth is being
effected from the developing nations of the South to the developed nations
of the North. States need to intervene to interrupt and reverse the patterns
of the South's 'dependency' on the North. Structuralists advocate for a much
stronger, dirigiste state in the developing countries.41 They are skeptical of
"trickle down" and question the motives of foreign investors,42 subjecting
them to significant regulation by the state. Too often, they say, foreign
investors control the most dynamic sectors of the economy, expropriating the
surplus produced via repatriation of profits, transfer pricing, royalty fees,
and licensing agreements.
Many policy makers in the South have placed limits on the repatriation of
profits on foreign investment and on the number of foreign workers
employed in domestic enterprises. Some have implemented sufficient
constraints on foreign capital so as to effectively bar any foreign participation
at all in certain sectors of the domestic economy.43 In this manner they
hope to keep more of the national wealth at home and to foster "self-reliant"
development.'
In pursuing their objectives, and often because of capability constraints of
inadequate technical skills and financial capital, governments influenced by
structural theorists have invested heavily in state enterprises and/or
established import substitution policies through, for example, the erection of
high tariff barriers to protect domestic industry from foreign competition.
Import substitution has been particularly widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa
and
virtually every national administration south of the Sahara opted
for heavy parastatal involvement. As Guinea's late president,
Sekou Toure, once commented, 'there were no private companies
[after independence], because France had suppressed all previous
such entities. So what would you have done in our place?
Suppose your country had no corporate entities and no financial

40. See C. CHASE-DUNN, supra note 13, at 288.

I. WALLERSTEIN, CAPITALIST WORLD

ECONOMY 18 (1979). See also Matthews, supra note 7, at 272 and 293. See also infra notes
51-55 and accompanying text.
41.

See, e.g., R. HIGorr, PouITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY 82 (1983); see also J. SPERO,

supra note 36, at 236-38.
42. Logli, Industry in Africa, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, supra note 13, at 57.
43. See generally J.SPERO, supra note 36, at 236-41.
44. Id. There is a national and regional aspect to self-reliance. See generally Sauvant, infra
note 108, at 33-35.
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groups. Suppose there was nothing and no one had money. What
would you do? . . . Look at the Guinean reality, and do not

confuse it with the context of your own experience, which is
different from ours.' 45
Equitable social and economic policies are also legitimate governmental
concerns in these countries. Structuralists say that development should be
measured by indicators in addition to GDP, such as the number of doctors
per capita, average life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy levels.
"Trickle down" is unreliable; states must provide public sector social
services to improve these indicators. In sum,
[d]evelopment, as seen by the modernizationists, comes about
when individuals operate in the free market to achieve economic
progress. A developing industrial economy will bring more
persons to a higher standard of living. Government is responsible
for policies designed to reinforce individual aspirations and actions
Structuralists, on the other hand, view the State as representing
the society and, in some sense, responsible to it for shaping an
equitable economy. Industrialization policies alone are .
bankrupt; the rules and regimes currently regulating the international economy work to the disadvantage of the world's poor.
States must intervene in the economy to ensure that the basic
needs of the population are being met. ..
External and Internal Factors in Underdevelopment
Turning now to the first question, why does African underdevelopment
persist?

Responses are informed, not surprisingly, by one's view of the

causes of underdevelopment and appropriate development policies. Certainly
the African states are not homogeneous, 47 making generalization difficult
45.

Sparks, supra note 30, at 36. This author points out, however, that state-owned enter-

prises often serve political objectives for the governments involved. For instance, they provide
both patronage and consumer subsidies through pricing policies. Id. at 37.
46. Matthews, supra note 7, at 276.
47. Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, 'Congo, Guinea, Mail, and Benin, for instance, have all
had one form or another of Marxist-Leninist government. Williams, supra note 13, at 23.
Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Ghana have had, at least at some point in their histories,
Westminster-type parliamentary systems. Id. at 24. More recently one-party rule has prevailed
in, for instance, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zimbabwe, among others. Id. at 25.
Coups d'etat have been rampant:
The military coup has become, along with the death or retirement of the earlier
generation of African leaders, the main mechanism for political change. In only
one independent African state, Mauritius, in 1982 and 1983, have governments
relinquished office as the result of freely-held elections and parliamentary defeats.
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and the possibility of any universal explanation remote.
It is useful, however, to organize the various explanations into two general

categories which roughly track the theories of development set out above:
causes external to the African states (including structural problems reflected
by declining terms of trade) and causes internal to the African states
(particularly domestic policy regimes which over-protect the internal market).

Those who point to causes beyond the control of states stress, among
others, the following factors influencing African underdevelopment: cyclical
drought and increasing desertification, burgeoning national populations,"
rising world interest rates (leading to onerous debt service burdens),

inadequate domestic markets resulting from the (mostly small) states established after decolonization, declining terms of trade or other fluctuations
in export revenues, and, the internal policies of, and conditions in, Northern
trading partners (including recession, discriminatory tariff policies, import
quotas and domestic agricultural subsidies).
Those who point to internal causes emphasize a different set of factors:
unwieldy, ineffective national governments implementing protective domestic
policy regimes (including overvalued exchange rates, high import tariffs,
quantitative trade restrictions, restrictions on foreign investment, inappropri-

ate credit policies which subsidize parastatal enterprises at the expense of the
private sector, and price controls discriminating against agricultural
production and the rural sector in favor of the urban population), poor
infrastructure (including transport, communications, and energy), low levels
of domestic savings, a shortage of technical skills, poor project planning and
mismanagement, and, lastly, official corruption.
Space does not permit a detailed presentation of each of these factors in the
context of the two development theories discussed above. I view as critical
two insights provided by these groups: the declining terms of trade described
by the structuralists and the adverse domestic policy environments under-

Id. at26.
Nor are the differences between African countries limited to the political. Nigeria, SubSaharan Africa's largest country, had a population of 110.1 million in mid-1988; tiny Sao Tome
and Principe's population was 119,000 in that same year (eight other African countries have
populations below 1 million). WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 178 and 243.
Zambia, with a population in 1988 of 7.6 million, has relatively low illiteracy rates of 33%
and 24% for its female and male inhabitants, respectively. Contrast this with Niger, population
7.3 million, with illiteracy rates of 91% and 86%. Unfortunately, most Sub-Saharan countries
approach the illiteracy rate of Niger rather than that of Zambia. Id. at 178.
The level of urbanization of the population also varies. Fifty-three per cent of Zambia's
population, for instance, live in urban areas. In Botswana and Burkina Faso the percentages are
21% and 7%, respectively. Sparks, supra note 30, at 31. The climate ranges from desert to
rain forest to plains. Id.
Incomes in 1988 ranged from $3,800 per capita in the Seychelles to $100 per capita in
Mozambique. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 178, 243.
48. Some list natural disasters and rapid population growth as internal causes of underdevelopment. Sparks, supra note 30, at 33. While perhaps not external in the same sense as, for
example, declining terms of trade or internal economic policies of trading partners, these factors
are nevertheless beyond the control of African countries in light of the lack of resources to
address these issues.
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scored by the modernizationists. These insights suggest that while structuralist theory has considerable descriptive power, the modernizationist
group's advocacy of reform of domestic policy regimes (via IMF/World
Bank 'structural adjustment') in developing countries is now the dominant
prescriptive theory for combatting underdevelopment in Africa.
It is well known that the international trade of most developing countries
is based almost entirely on unprocessed, primary commodities.49 In most
instances countries in the South are entirely dependent on one or a few key
agricultural and/or mineral products' to earn the foreign exchange necessary to purchase (often vital) imports from the North. Not surprisingly,
then, commodities receive a great deal of attention in articles and studies
dealing with development.
The writings of Raul Prebisch and other Latin American economists in
the 1950s and 60s developed the operation of the principle of unequal
exchange. In general, the unequal exchange theory says that, over time,
prices on commodities tend to fall and prices on processed goods tend to
rise, so much so that peripheral economies are at a permanent disadvantage
with respect to the developed economies of the North.51 The reasons given
for this include the slowdown in external demand and increase in supply of
many primary products,5" the development of synthetic substitutes, and
tariffs or quotas in the North on the importation of tropical goods.53

49. Primary commodity exports represent 90% of total ACP country exports. ACP-Council:
Bold Action called for on Debt and on South Africa, The Courier, No. 110, July-Aug., 1988,
Yellow Pages at II. See generally Dossier: Commodity Prices, The Courier, No. 116, JulyAug., 1989, at 56.
50. Among the most important of these for Africa are oil, coffee, copper, cocoa, wood and
sugar. Training and Commodities: Development Priorities for the Social Partners, The Courier,
No. 119, Jan.-Feb., 1990, at 7.
For a breakdown of ACP countries and their primary agricultural commodity exports, see
Kibola, Stabex and Lond 11, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 32, 36-37 (1984).
51. See, e.g., Prebisch, Toward a New Trade Policy for Development, in RESHAPING THE
WORLD ECONOMY 110-12 (Pincus ed. 1968).
52. According to the GATT, the volume of world commodity output has more or less steadily
increased for the period 1950-85 (except for minerals, where output decreased in 1980 to 1976
levels). To get some idea of the magnitude of the growth in commodities output, note that
mineral output in 1985 was about 20% over 1970 levels (GATiT's benchmark year). By 1985
agricultural output had increased fully 40% over 1970 levels. N. GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: NEW PATrERNS OF TRADE, PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 52 (1989), especially Figure

2.2.
Commodities constituted 53.5% of world trade in 1955, 37.7% in 1978 and 36% in 1985.
Id. at 58.
53. C. CHASE-DUNN, supra note 13, at 289. This source also describes the "SingerPrebisch" thesis:
'This thesis suggests that due to weaker organization, the unequal relationship
between the developed and the underdeveloped worlds leads to a situation where,
in the case of primary products, the gains in productivity are translated into a
decline in prices, while in the case of manufacturers, those gains are translated into
higher salaries and profits.'
Id. (citation omitted).
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Whatever the reason(s), the fact remains that, in 1989, average commodity
prices for developing country exports were 33% lower than in 1980.1
In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, one respected source reports:
worsening terms of trade [over the past decade], with declining
traditional exports, both in price and quantities, and increasing
imports, also in both price and volume.
Expressing the terms-of-trade dilemma of Sub-Saharan Africa in
another way . . . the prices of the region's 25 most important
commodities have been falling on the world market for the past
decade. In 1971 the beef from one Sahelian cow could pay for a
barrel of petroleum; in 1981 the beef from nine cows was
needed.55
Introduction to StructuralAdjustment

Unfavorable terms of trade have certainly contributed to the severe balance
of payments problems resulting from chronic current-account deficits in
African countries. This has led, in turn, to increased debt loads as country
after country in Sub-Saharan Africa borrowed (mostly from official
multilateral and bilateral sources)' to make up for export earnings short-

54. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 13. It is interesting to note that the World Bank
in 1990 gives much more emphasis to the adverse effects of the declining terms of trade to
development in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1990 than it did in 1981.
In the Berg Report, supra note 22, economist Eliot Berg suggested that Sub-Saharan Africa's
temis of trade had not sufficiently worsened in the 1970s to warrant placing undue emphasis on
that factor, "suggesting instead that the current account deficits and the shortages of foreign
exchange were caused primarily by
.
.... policy biases against agricultural exports, rapid
population growth and the 'inflexibility' of African economies." Sparks, supra note 30, at 32.
By 1990, the World Bank itself admitted that commodity price declines in the 1980s cost SubSaharan African countries 15% of their exports' real import purchasing power relative to the
1970s. WoRLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 13. When factoring in rapid population
growth, it is clear that the decline is even more significant in per capita terms.
55. Sparks, supra note 30, at 32.
56.

In Sub-Saharan Africa... [c]ommerical borrowing has been a significant source
of funds only for a handful of middle income or resource-rich countries. Between
1984 and 1989 only 6 percent of net flow came from private sources. As a result,
more than 65 percent of the stock of foreign debt in the region is official....
WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 14.
Very little of this official debt is owed to the Community, due to the highly concessional terms
of Lomd assistance. ACP debt to the Community represents 1.2% of total ACP debt servicing
costs. A Convention for a Changed World, Lorai IV Signed, The Courier, No. 120, MarchApril, 1990, at 2. Nevertheless, the Commission has recently proposed that Member States
approve a write off ACP debt to the EEC. See infra note 265.
Lom6 IV has new debt provisions (arts. 239-242), wherein the Community agrees to provide
technical assistance for debt management and international financial negotiations. It also
"declares its readiness to continue to exchange views, within the context of international
discussions, on the general problem of debt .... " (Annex L)
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falls. Debt-service ratios (interest and repayments on debt expressed as a
percentage of export earnings) have skyrocketed due, among other factors,
to inadequate debt forgiveness or restructuring, high real interest rates,
continued borrowing, and overall declines in commodities prices.57 Foreign
exchange, never abundant in these countries, increasingly goes to service this
debt, dramatically reducing the amount available for imports and discouraging foreign investment at a time when many Sub-Saharan African countries
have finally initiated policy reform precisely to encourage such investment."' As the World Bank noted,
[e]xternal shocks precipitated the crisis of the 1980s. But internal
structure determined how countries would respond. Faced with
changed circumstances, countries now have no choice but to
adjust. During the 1980s governments of countries at all income
levels and, remarkably, of all ideological stripes have come to
recognize the need for reforms to increase economic efficiency
and flexibility."
It is to this policy reform that I now turn. It has been suggested that
structural theorists have provided insight into causes of underdevelopment,
providing a more accurate appraisal of the South's position in the international economy than the "stages of growth" group. This is a significant
achievement.
Structural theorists have been markedly less successful in advancing policy
Import
prescriptions to address the problems they have described.'
substitution policies, prominent among their recommendations, have mostly
failed to cut back on imports or to produce competitive exports. Lack of
technical know-how, inadequate financing and product diversification, lowskilled labor, small internal markets (preventing economies of scale), mismanagement and outright corruption, poor infrastructure, inadequate
transport, and the need for intermediate, imported inputs have all contributed
to these failures.

Some see the Commission "well-placed to act as a catalyst and even a manager of the debt
reform process for sub-Saharan Africa." Watkins, supra note 17, at 51. Dieter Frisch, Director-General for Development, recently "highlighted the role of the Commission as a moderator
and an initiator of sensible policies for debt relief" in a talk before London's Royal Commonwealth Society. Dieter Frisch goes to Bonn and to London, The Courier, No. 113, Jan.-Feb.,
1989, Yellow Pages at VII.
Likewise Development Commissioner Matin recently promised to provide technical assistance
to ACP countries in their negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions and the Club of Paris.
(Interview with Manuel Manin) A Non-Interventionist Concept of Development, The Courier,
No. 121, May-June, 1990, at 3 [hereinafter Main].
57. See generally Sparks, supra note 30.
58. Id.
59. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1989, 10 (1989).
60. See generally AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND THE WORLD BANK:
QUESTIONS, COSTLY CHOICES (Cummins ed. 1988).
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Negligible or negative growth rates in the 1980s, moreover, have made
Sub-Saharan African countries increasingly poor candidates for loans from
commercial banks. Many countries in the region have had to turn to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank for help with current
account deficits.6 Both institutions have provided special lending facilities
to assist Sub-Saharan Africa with balance of payments problems conditioned,
however, upon the countries involved undertaking so-called "structural
adjustment" programs.' According to the World Bank,
[a]t the most abstract level, adjustment programs use changes in
fiscal, monetary, and sectoral policies, in regulations, and in
institutions to alter relative prices and the level of [public]
spending and thereby redirect economic activity. The real
exchange rate and the real interest rate are key relative prices.
They affect both economic activity and saving, as well as exports
and imports and the rate of investments. Changes in taxes,
subsidies, and quantitative controls move resources between
sectors. Ensuring that adjustment achieves a balanced change in
spending and an appropriate sectoral reallocation is critical for
growth and development.'
Structural adjustment starts with the undeniable premise that most SubSaharan African countries entered the decade of the 1980s with over-valued
domestic currencies.' Due to high rates of domestic price inflation in the
mid-1970s and the failure to devalue national currencies to compensate, the
prices of imported goods declined relative to domestic goods, leading to an
increase in demand for imports. Over-valued currencies also meant higher
relative prices for exports, adversely affecting external demand for Africa's
products.'
These and other factors substantially contributed to foreign
exchange shortages and the resulting balance of payments crisis in African
countries.'
At a minimum, both the IMF and the World Bank have required currency

61. By the year 1988, 32 countries in the region were participating in structural adjustment
operations. Sparks, supra note 30, at 36. For a list of countries as of 1987, see Dossier:
Structural Adjustment, The Courier, No. 111, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 66.
62. See generally Dossier: Structural Adjustment, supra note 61, at 50-75.
The World Bank has gradually transformed its structures and instruments to
become more of an adjustment bank as the percentage of its transfers to Africa
devoted to loans linked to policy reform has increased.
Id. at 52. This linkage is known as "conditionality."
63.

THE WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 10-11.

64. Sparks, supra note 30, at 35.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 35-36.
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devaluation as a condition for loans covering current account deficits. Such
a devaluation immediately results in higher import prices. Higher prices for

imports deflate domestic demand for foreign products, thereby easing the
balance of payments problem. Devaluation also reduces the price of a
country's exports on world markets, thereby stimulating the external demand
for its goods.

In practice, conditionality for IMF/World Bank assistance only begins with
devaluation. Usually there is a concomitant demand for reduced public
spending (via a reduction in the size of the government bureaucracy and a
decrease or outright elimination of public subsidies, including those for food,
health, education, utilities, or other public goods), privatization of stateowned enterprises, and/or a reduction or elimination of domestic price
controls .67

Reform in the regulatory regime governing foreign direct investment, and
a shift in policy emphasis from import substitution to export promotion
(particular in the customs area), complete the package of conditions.
Domestic consumption, private and public, of imports becomes leaner and
exports are increased. The domestic economy, thus restructured, is brought
into equilibrium with the world economy.
IMF and World Bank programmed lending has typically had short
timetables and inflexible targets for the implementation of policy reforms,
leading to the rapid destablization of economies where structural adjustment
is operative." In the African context, the structural adjustment programs
have been criticized by Commission officials as frequently undifferentiated,
taking an "over-theoretical, over-standardised view of adjustment."' These
programs have not been tailored to the individual characteristics of each
country's economy.
Increased unemployment results from both the reduction of government
bureaucracies and from the reduction or the elimination of subsidies to, and
tariff protection for, import substitution industries. This unemployment,
coupled with steep increases in the prices of imports due to devaluation and
massive reductions in the funding of social services and price subsidies, gives
rise to greater internal social inequities and domestic opposition. This
opposition has erupted into violent rioting and, as in the case of Ghana,
sometimes resulted in coups d'etat in the affected countries.' °
Yet, structural adjustment remains the reality for much of Sub-Saharan
Africa. Not only must these governments remain dependent on official
lending to cope with balance of payments problems, but all forms of official
development assistance from some multilateral institutions and Northern

67. Id.
68. Dossier: Structural Adjustment, supra note 61, at 70.
accompanying text.
69. Dossier: Structural Adjustment, supra note 61, at 70.
70. See Williams, supra note 13, at 25-27.
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states (in particular the United States) are increasingly being conditioned on
the implementation of on-going structural adjustment reforms.71
IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies in Sub-Saharan Africa have
been bitterly criticized.' Some of these criticisms, such as the undifferentiated nature and social costs of austerity policies, I have already discussed.
Privatization requirements are questioned since no alternative to public
ownership exists in states where domestic capital and entrepreneurial skills
are weak or nonexistent.
Some have seen a concerted policy of 'deindustrializing' the South, causing
it to lose what ground has been gained in its attempts to alter the traditional
international division of labor.' 3 These critics speculate about why little or
no discussion of the obvious benefits to transnational capital from structural
adjustment appears to occur within the institutions advancing these policies:
The scientific method to use in such situations would be one that
analyzed results of the policies and from there deduced the
objectives of the policy. On that basis it is reasonable to conclude
that the new emphasis [in IMF/World Bank lending] on policy
formation is designed to increase the disarticulation of industrial
capital within the peripheral capitalist economies, and to subordinate such industrial capital as remains to transnational capital
which will use such peripheral capital as it sees fit.74
The World Bank recently claimed that trends during the period 1985-1987
show improved, albeit modest, GDP growth for Sub-Saharan African
countries undergoing adjustment over those not undergoing reforms.'
Cynics, however, pointed out that such improvements can be explained by
the relative ease these countries have of obtaining donor assistance.76
External flows increasingly are following policy reforms. They questioned
"whether there was sufficient money-let alone commitment-in the donor

71. See, e.g., WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 133; The Paris Conference on the
Least Developed Countries, The Courier, No. 124, Nov.-Dec., 1990, Yellow Pages at VIII.
72. See generally AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND THE WORLD BANK: HARD
QUESTIONS, COSTLY CHOICES, supra note 60.
73. Cypher, The Crisis and the Restructuring of Capitalism in the Periphery, 11 RESEARCH
IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 72 (P. Zarembka, ed. 1988).
74. Id. at 76. Despite the implications, the author doesn't appear to believe that there is an
overt conspiracy in multilateral institutions. Rather, "guided by neoclassical theory and

dogma[,] the 'invisible hands' of capitalist structure realize a project not consciously articulated
[by them]."
IMF/World Bank officials believe in the efficacy of liberal domestic policies, the author states,
and the benefits accruing to transnational capital are simply "a fortuitous by-product of [their]
brave new monetarist world." Id.
75. EncouragingEvidence ofAfrican Progress-the World Bank View, The Courier, No. 116,
July-Aug., 1989, at 13-14.
76. Id. at 12. See also infra note 77 and Pollen & Cockburn, The World, the Free Market,
and the Left, 252 Nation No. 7, Feb. 25, 1991, at 224.
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community to ensure that all ailing sub-Saharan economies got assistance on
that scale.""I
Having laid some foundation, I will return to the subjects of structural
adjustment and conditionality later in this article when I further elaborate on

the differences between Lomd's approaches to these issues and those of the
United States and the IMF/World Bank.

First, however, I present an

abbreviated examination of the historical ties between Europe and Africa,
along with an overview of antecedents to the Lomd process, as a prelude to
my general examination of Lomd's provisions.
PART Two

Europe and ColonialAfrica

Any meaningful examination of current EEC/ACP relations must be
informed by the nature of past relations. Economic progress can be
measured statistically, but political and social progress is best appreciated
through a contrast with the patterns of past relationships. Early European
intervention in Africa dates from the 1440s and for several centuries
consisted in the traffic of African slaves between Europe and her American

colonies .
It is estimated that up to ten million slaves were landed in the Americas
before the slave trade ended in the 1880s.

Gold and ivory also figured

prominently in early trade. 9
By the late nineteenth century, African exports to Europe had expanded to
include wool, cotton, palm oil, peanuts and cloves.'e At the Conference of
Berlin in 1884, where the slave trade was abolished, the European powers

set out ground-rules for establishing European protectorates in the African
77. Glaser, Analysing the Effects of Structural Adjustment, The Courier, No. 116, July-Aug.,
1989, at 12. Glaser cites the World Bank's own statistics, which show that financial flows have
followed reform efforts.
Glaser also expressed concern that IMF/World Bank lending adds debt for the future and,
further, cites a "study on the forestry sector [in Ghana] which notes that derestricted private
enterprise, combined with foreign funding, have led to numerous abuses and the depletion of
precious natural resources." Id. at 12, 13.
None of the forgoing is intended to signify that fundamental reforms, of the nature
of structural adjustment, are not necessary nor that their results are unworthy of
study and applause. [The World Bank analysis] is however heavily weighted in
favour of the quantitative approach to which this introduction seeks to act as a
counterbalance.
Id. at 13.
78. The historical material appearing here was taken from Girard, Toward Lomn Ill:
Perfecting the European Community's African Partnership, 16 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 459,
463-66 (1984); Yard, supra note 3, at 642-45; and Davidson, Africa in Historical Perspective,
in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, supra note 13, at 11.
79. Yard, supra note 3, at 643.
80. Girard, supra note 78, at 463 n.20.
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continent.81 France, which acquired the largest portion of territory, Great
Britain, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Germany all had established and
maintained important colonies in Africa that served both as sources for raw
materials and markets for home country manufactures.Y
By the early twentieth century, many colonies had well-established
agricultural and extractive sectors. Exports expanded to include additional
commodities: sugar, rubber, coffee, tea, cocoa, sisal, tobacco, fruits,
diamonds, tin, copper, bauxite, manganese, iron ore, phosphates, oil and
natural gas.' Except for the mining activities, there was little industry:
There was, no doubt, a large introduction [into Africa] of
mechanical and even of industrial technology during the colonial
period. Deep mines were sunk and exploited; railways were
thrust inland from the seaboard; modern ports were excavated;
motor cars and trucks increasingly displaced primitive methods of
transport; a new commercialism began to flourish. But the central
point

. . .

is that with very few exceptions this was always an

unassimilated technology.u
Commodities and trade were the preeminent sectors in the African
colonies; industrial production remained centered in Europe. Africans were
given no voice in determining their role in the international division of labor.
The terms of Europe's trade with Africa in the late 19th century
were unilaterally defined by economic and military coercion...
Both colonial administration and pressure from overseas
suppliers anxious to retain their African markets tended to
preclude industrial development in Africa.'
Decolonization and Association
In the post World War I period, the newly formed League of Nations set
up the mandate system to oversee the former colonies of Turkey and
Germany. After the devastation of Europe in World War II, the African
colonies increasingly were viewed as economic liabilities to the emasculated
European economies. Africans, moreover, became nationalistic and many
formed political parties and liberation movements.'
These raised the

81. Id. n.24.
82. Id. at 463-64.
83. Id. at 463 n.20.
84. Davidson, supra note 78, at 11.
85. Id.
86. See Williams, supra note 13, at 19. See also AFRICA IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 534-38 (Anene & Brown, eds. 1966).
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banner of self-determination in an effort to gain control of their territoriesY
Great Britain responded by giving independence to its former colonies.
France, on the other hand, opted for a system of reform in colonial
administration and increased the participation of local elites in the governance
of her colonies. Nevertheless, in the three decades following the war most

of Sub-Saharan Africa, including the former French colonies, became
independent.
Few African countries, however, had achieved independence by 1957, the
year that the Treaty of Rome was signed.88 During the negotiations leading
up to the establishment of the Community, France initially proposed
integrating her colonies into the arrangement." France wished to secure
alternate markets for their products, production of which exceeded France's
domestic demand. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands,
fearful that the EEC was promoting collective colonialism and unwilling to
share the financial burden of France's colonial possessions, resisted. Both
eventually gave way to compromise when it became clear that France would
not sign onto the Community absent concessions in this area.'
The compromise to full inclusion in the Community was so-called
"Associated Status" pursuant to Part IV of the Treaty of Rome for the
territories associated with France and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, Italy and
the Netherlands.9" "The basic purpose of the association with [these
territories] was to promote their 'economic and social development' and to
'establish close relations' between [these territories] and the Community as
a whole."'
The hallmarks of this association were both the preferential access to the
EEC Member States for Associates' commodity exports and a corresponding
pledge by the Associates to provide the same preferential treatment to
imports from Member States that it formerly had provided to the imports of
the Member State with which it had special relations.' The Associates also
agreed to move toward the gradual elimination of all duties charged on
imports from the EEC.' Hence the arrangement was one of "reverse preferences." The net effect was to discourage the development of an industrial
base in the participating African territories, since no tariffs could be put in
87. AFRICA IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES, supra note 86, at 534-38.
Specific countries are discussed in Williams, supra note 13, at 19.
88. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The original signatories were France, West Germany,
Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
89. Information from this section comes from Yard, supra note 3, at 645 and Girard, supra
note 78, at 467.
90. Girard, supra note 78, at 467-68; Yard, supra note 3, at 647.
91. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 88, arts. 131-36 and Annex IV.
92. McMahon, The Renegotiation of Lom: Inventing the Future, 14 EUR. L. REV. 140, 141
(1989), quoting from art. 132 of the Treaty of Rome.
93. Girard, supra note 78 at 469; Yard, supra note 3, at 648.
94. Girard, supra note 78 at 469; Yard, supra note 3, at 648.
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place to keep out cheaper imports and thereby encourage local industrial
production. Thus was perpetuated the colonial division of labor.
That Associated Status did not foster growth in trade between EEC and
Associated States is supported by statistical evidence:

EEC imports from the Associated States, as a percentage of total
EEC imports from developing countries, declined from 13.4% in
1958 to 7.4% in 1974. Moreover, EEC exports to Associated
States, as a percentage of total EEC exports to developing

countries, declined from 11.6% in 1958 to 9.9% in 1973."
Associated status had other perceived benefits, however. For example, the
Implementing Convention" of the Treaty of Rome also established the

European Development Fund (EDF). The EDF was initially funded in the
amount of $581.25 million over a five-year period and supplemented the
bilateral development aid (largely directed toward infrastructure) provided to
Associates by certain individual Member States.'
By the early 1960s many former associated territories had become
sovereign countries. Some of these new nations wished to continue the
association regime, in particular to benefit from the aid provided under the
EDF." Negotiations between these states and the Community led to a
replenishment of the EDF and the signing of Yaounde I in July, 1963 at
Yaounde, Cameroon.' The agreement was renewed, and the EDF replenished a third time, when Yaounde II was executed in 1969."°
These
agreements maintained the essential character of the arrangements of
Associated Status under the Treaty of Rome: reciprocal trade preferences,
prohibition of discrimination against or between Member States, and duty-

95. Girard, supra note 78, at 471.
96. Implementing Convention Relating to the Association with the Community of the Overseas
Countries and Territories, May 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-11) (official
English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 157 (1958).
97. The EDF has become a fixture in EEC/ACP relations. The seventh EDF, funded by
Lom6 IV, has a current allocation of ECU 10,800m (or about $14.58 billion) for the five-year
period commencing March 1, 1990. A further ECU 1,200m (or about $1.65 billion) is provided
in the form of loans from the European Investment Bank. See also infra Part Three
on Development Finance Cooperation.
For a summary table of the first through seventh EDFs, see EEC-ACP Cooperation: The
HistoricalPerspective, The Courier, No. 120, Mar.-April, 1990, at 24, 26.
98. Girard, supra note 78, at 470.
99. Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community and the African
and Malagasy States Associated with that Community, July 20, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 971 (1963)
[hereinafter Yaounde I]. The African states included Senegal, Mali, Ivory Coast, Dahomey,
Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta, the Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon,
Madagascar, Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia.
For some of the poorer African states EDF aid accounted for as much as 30% of total external
aid received. Girard, supra note 78, at 470 n.79.
100. Convention of Association Between the European Economic Community and the African
and Malagasy States Associated with that Community, July 29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 484 (1970)
[hereinafter Yaounde II]. In 1972, Mauritius was added as a party to the agreement.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

25

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1991], Art. 2

26

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22

free access to the EEC for a limited number of primary products."° ' The
remaining imports from Yaounde signatories benefited from the same rate of
duty in effect between the Member States." 2
The NIEO and the Birth of Lom
In 1973 Great Britain acceded to the Community.'
The Commonwealth
countries of Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean thereby became "associable" under the Treaty of Accession. In 1974 these Commonwealth countries
met with the Yaounde countries and six other independent Sub-Saharan
African states under the auspices of the Organization for African Unity
(OAU)' °4 and formed the ACP group.1

The ACP group presented a

unified bargaining position in the negotiations leading up to Lom6 I and
continues to represent a significant example of South/South cooperation.
Lom6 I negotiations took place under markedly different conditions than
those obtaining in earlier EEC-African negotiations. While Treaty of Rome
and Yaounde provisions for Africa largely originated with the Member
States, demanding reciprocity and perpetuating a neo-colonial division of
labor, Lom6 I negotiations took place at a time of great upheaval in the
world economy. Certain countries in the oil-producing South were beginning
to flex their economic muscle. The Yaounde countries included potentially
important oil producers. The oil shocks of the early 1970s had caught the
attention of the Europeans, who increasingly came to recognize the necessity
of securing their access to this resource.
The threat of other producer cartels along the lines of the highly successful
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries caused the EEC to wish to
secure supplies of other primary commodities, as well. During the period
of Lomd I negotiations, developing countries also came together in the
United Nations General Assembly to urge the adoption of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States"°6 and the Declaration and the
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic

101. Girard, supra note 78, at 468-70.
102. Id. at 470.
103. Treaty concerning the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Britain
and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy
Community, Jan. 22, 1972, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 0. J. Eur.Comm. Special
Edition March 27, 1972, at 5 [hereinafter Treaty of Accession].
104. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 2 I.L.M.
766 (1963).
105. See supra note 2.
106. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) (December 12, 1974) adopted by a vote of 120 to 6 (Belgium,
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United
States voted no). Ten states abstained (Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
The Netherlands, Norway and Spain). Thus, all the then members of the EEC either voted no
or abstained.
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states) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 1°0 led by Raul Prebisch as its first secretary general, began to
actively promote the interests of the South in international forums.
A major thrust of these efforts was the formation of a more equitable world
trading order, based on Southern solidarity, to secure preferential access to
the markets of the North and to ensure adequate compensation for'the
South's natural resources. The NIEO also called for increased aid from the
North and the linkage of aid to commodity access.

At the same time it

became increasingly clear that the North was no longer willing or able to

107. G.A. Res. 3201 (VI) (May 1, 1974) and G.A. Res. 3202 (VI) (May 1, 1974). Both were
adopted without vote but with a number of significant stated reservations by the U.S., the
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom.
For more on the NIEO and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, see
.
R.MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER: A STUDY OF THE
CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (1979); T. FRANCK & M. MANUANSANGU, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING?
(1982); and Sauvant, "The NIEO Program:Reasons, Proposals, and Progress" in CHANGING
PRIORITIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 78-138 (K. Sauvant ed. 1981).
108. A more complete discussion of the Group of Seventy-Seven and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development is beyond the scope of this article. See Sauvant,
Organizational Infrastructurefor Self-Reliance: The Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of
77, in THE CHALLENGE OF NORTH-SOUTH COOPERATION 33-72 (B. Pavlic ed. 1983); and A.
MACBEAN & P. SNOWDEN, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN TRADE AND FINANCE 93-109
(1981).
See also the interesting remarks contained in T. WEISS, MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT
DIPLOMACY IN UNCTAD (1986). This excerpt first sets out the common wisdom:
'The South favours a universal, multilateral system of public negotiation which
gives due recognition to the weight of numbers.
It wants comprehensive
negotiations dealing with packages of issues and giving full weight to the linkages
between them. It believes that needs, equality and redistributive justice, rather
than power, should be the criteria adopted. The North, on the other hand, favours
traditional bilateral forms of negotiations or those involving limited participation,
and views multilateral diplomacy in the North-South context skeptically, both on
technical and political grounds. It prefers negotiations which are specific and
issue-oriented.
It believes that economic power and responsibility for the
implementation of decisions must be fully reflected in the negotiations ....'
Id. at 8, 9 (citation omitted). The author (a former UNCTAD official) urges the South, on the
other hand, to recognize the posture of the North and its own internal divisions and, thus, the
"futility" of UNCTAD's practice of group negotiations. Id. at 55. His alternative might be
called "minilateral" negotiations. He cites the Lomd agreements with approval:
As a counter example to UNCTAD's practice of group negotiations, one could
point to the trade and aid relationships between the members of the EEC and its
ACP partners.
The negotiations were not global but took place between differentiated sections of
the South and the North. There was not simply a group of northern countries
reacting defensively to demands for general reform emanating from the South
which ignored pertinent northern concerns. While one should not exaggerate the
significance of Lomd, one should also not denigrate the fact that concrete and
limited policy reform measures were discussed and agreed....

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

27

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1991], Art. 2
28

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.

22

secure access to raw materials through political or military action. 1"
The terms contained in the new Lom I agreement represented an important
shift from those contained in the earlier Yaounde agreements. Developments
in Lomd I that have received significant attention in the literature included
the elimination of reciprocity in favor of unilateral preferences for certain
ACP exports, increased participation of ACP states in aid management, and
the formation of a commodity price stabilization program. These and other
provisions are examined in Part Three.
Less attention has been given to what is perhaps the more far-reaching and
potentially significant change represented by the continuing Lomd process;
namely, the movement away from the unilateral declaration by Europe of its
policies in Africa toward a negotiated and institutionalized relationship
between the cooperating EEC and ACP states based on parity between the
two partners. These developments are central to this article and will also be
discussed below.
In concluding this Part Two, reference has already been made to the heady
days of the early seventies when the South sought to unite, wield what
economic power it had, and advance the work in the U.N. and elsewhere on
the NIEO. Since that time, however, little real progress has been made to
advance the NIEO agenda." ' The South's marginal economic power, its
declining terms of trade, its declining importance as an area of superpower
competition, and its own internal divisions made it possible for Northern
opponents to defeat or weaken its proposals.
While UNCTAD provides important technical services for the South and
a forum for North/South negotiations,' the absence of any real power to
affect trade and finance issues (which resides in the GATI, 1n2 and the
IMF, respectively) has made it ineffective.'
Likewise aid, whether grants
or loans, is generally controlled by the World Bank and its International
Development Association (IDA) and other multilateral and bilateral
donors. 1 4
A salutary feature of Lom6 is the holistic approach it takes to aid, trade,
and finance. All of these are treated in one document and administered by

109. J. SPERO, supra note 36, at 202-03.
110.
111.
112.
trade

T. WEIss, supra note 108, at 55.
What is UNCTAD?, The Courier, No. 116, July-Aug., 1989, at 71.
The General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) takes the form of a multilateral
agreement setting forth the principles under which the signatories, on a basis of

"reciprocity and mutual advantage," shall negotiate "a substantial reduction in customs tariffs

and other impediments to trade." General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. 5-6, T.S. No. 814, 55-61 U.N.T.S.
Provision is made, through authorization of a Generalized System of Preferences and other
permissible derogations from the GATT, for more favorable and non-reciprocal treatment to be
afforded to developing countries. See Principles and Objectives of GA7T, The Courier, No.
116, July-Aug., 1989, at 4. As of 1989, 96 countries, including the EEC Member States and
36 ACP nations, were contracting parties to the GAIT. Id. at 2.
113. For a thorough critique of UNCTAD, see generally T. WEISS, supra note 108.
114. WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 11, at 129.
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the institutions it establishes.115 This contrasts sharply with the atomistic
approach of the Bretton Woods institutions to these subjects and to their
division between separate departments or ministries in many developed
countries. Keep in mind also the weighted voting favoring the North in the
IMF and the World Bank (and the fact that many ACP states are not
signatories to the GATT) during the discussion below of the role ACP
institutions and the individual ACP countries play in Lomd negotiations and
implementation. For now, let me present a quick sketch of the starker
contrasts between Lomd and one set of examples from U.S./South relations.
LorrY, USAID and CBI. Some Contrasts
Lom IV represents perhaps the only significant contemporary manifestation of some key aspects of the NIE0 1 6 reflecting, as it does, the EEC's
willingness to offer a package of aid, trade, and finance measures to SubSaharan African countries while largely allowing them to determine their own
development strategies. "7 Its aid provisions are largely concessional; that
is, Lom6 aid is provided to countries who retain the authority to determine
their internal development and social policies.
Lom provides a buffer between developed and developing states
experiencing disputes, reducing the risk of the coercive use of aid.
Administered by the Commission and the joint ACP/EEC institutions, it is
in a nature of a contract, and cannot be controlled unilaterally by any of the
individual states comprising the Contracting Parties."' In this respect the
convention is unique, as Laurent Fabius, President of the French National
Assembly and member of the ACP/EEC Joint Assembly, recently observed:
Lomd . . . covers all types of development aid in an original
cooperation agreement. That agreement is between regions. No
Member State can diminish its effect and no ACP State can be
discriminated against or sanctioned. Difficulties, disputes even,
have arisen between different countries in the past, but they have
not affected the Agreements. This is a remarkable guarantee of
independence and non-alignment and there is nothing like it

115. Remark, however, that the European Investment Bank does administer loans from its own
resources and EDF risk capital. EIB funds represent a fairly small portion of total Lomd IV
financial resources.
116. See Simmonds I, supra note 1, at 315, 321 (1976). See also Benedek, The Lons'
Convention and the New International Law of Development: A Concretisation of the New
InternationalEconomic Order? 26 J. AFR. L. 74 (1982): The Lom6 conventions have "incorporated into a binding treaty more of the proposals contained in the Declaration and Programme
of Action on an N.I.E.O. than any other international instrument." Id. at 88.
117. These assertions are developed in Part Three, infra.
118. "Lom6 is a contract. This means that the ACP have a firm entitlement to its aid
allocation." Stevens, The Renegotiation of the Convention, in EUROPE, AFRICA AND LOMig III,
supra note 1, at 69. See also infra notes 224-34 and accompanying text.
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anywhere else. 19
In contrast, many other multilateral and bilateral aid programs demand a
high degree of conditionality. This has not been limited to reform of
domestic economic policy regimes, as Jordan has recently discovered by the
action of the United States Senate in cutting off aid to that country during the
1991 Gulf crisis."n In fairness, it must be conceded that EEC Member
States have also used their bilateral aid flows to influence beneficiaries'

foreign and domestic policies. Compare Lomd, which
is apparently perceived as at least tactically consistent with
remarkably different domestic strategies, power structures, income
distributions, emphasis on exports, other external economic links
and political economic ideologies."'
Apart from the use of aid as a weapon, and since Lomd specifically deals
with international development, it will be instructive to examine comparable
U.S. institutions and instruments, namely the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI).
In 1985, USAID published its Blueprint for Development, which called for
directing aid to countries adopting IMF/World Bank structural adjustment.'" Prior to 1981, the USAID had been concerned with agriculture,
health, education and appropriate technology. But, during the Reagan years,
the USAID has endorsed IMF conditionality for aid and urged the World
Bank and other bilateral aid donors to adopt similar policies." The thrust
of its argument tracks those contained in the Berg Report-that due to import
substitution, costly state-owned enterprises and other policy errors, the South
is the principal cause of its own underdevelopment.
The CBI, which gives beneficiaries duty-free access to the U.S. market,
illustrates conditionality:
It is true that the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) has some claim
to being a regionally-based development strategy, and that some
of its trade provisions compare favorably with those of the Lom
Convention. But in reality the CBI has never been more than an
extension of US strategic policy for the region, with members

119. Joint Assembly Meets in Versailles, The Courier, No. 118, Nov.-Dec., 1989, Yellow
Pages at I. See also infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.

120. After the War; Congress Withholds $55 Million in Aid to Jordan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23,
1991, at sec. 1, 5, col. 3 (late ed.). See also supra note 21.
121. Green, The Child of Lord: Messiah, Monster or Mouse, in THE POITICAL ECONOMY OF
EEC RELAIONS WITH AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES 14 (Long, ed. 1980).
122. The material in this and the next few paragraphs is largely taken from Cypher, supra note

73, at 45-82.
123. AFRICA'S DEvELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND THE WORLD BANK, supra note 60, at 128.
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selected primarily on the basis of their political affiliation ....
mhe relationship between the USA and the CBI states is that of
patron and client."2
There is a high degree of policy reform required in order to qualify for
CBI benefits---e.g., privatization, a restructuring of trade, and implementation of certain macroeconomic state and labor policies. Caribbean Basin
countries who wish to take advantage of the trade preferences the CBI
provides must also enter into bilateral investment treaties with the United
States."z
The provisions of the U.S. Development Fund for Africa, established in
In 1990, this aid program made
1987, further illustrate conditionality. 1'
some $560 million available for quick responses to the region's development
needs."n These funds, however, were restricted to those countries which
had undertaken domestic policy reforms along the IMF/World Bank
model. 1" The concessional features of Lored assistance are conspicuously
absent from U.S. aid programs such as these.
PART THREE

The 'Acquis' Lomg
It is understandable that Lomd I was heralded as a breakthrough in
collective North/South negotiations in light of the past and present unilateral
nature of most such relationships. Claude Cheysson, EEC Commissioner for
Cooperation and Development Policy when Lom I negotiations concluded
in 1975, described the occasion as
the first time that such a comprehensive approach to the problems
of development has been agreed by industrialised countries with
regard to such a large number of countries. It is unprecedented
also because the whole of Black Africa has stood together ....
we hope to have created a new pattern for the relationship
between industrialised and developing countries."
That the Lom process is intended to serve as a model of North/South
relations was expressed in Lomd I and repeated in each subsequent conven-

124. Watkins, supra note 17, at 50. See also Cypher, supra note 73, at 70.

125. Cypher, supra note 73, at 71.
126. Sparks, supra note 30, at 34.
127. Id.
128. The author also notes that the U.S. has agreed to forgive the debts owed to it by certain

African countries provided these countries initiate economic reforms. Id.
129. Cheysson, Europe and the Third World after LomJ, 31 THE WORLD TODAY 232, 235
(1975).
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tion.110 The conventions have been disappointing in this regard.131 Yet
the continued renewal, refinement, and expansion of the accords provide, at
a minimum, a useful educational function for the future.
Lomd I marked an important shift in European and African relations.
Another formative moment in EEC-ACP relations occurred with the formal
adoption of the so-called "acquis" Lomd in 1985. This acquis sets out the
objectives and guidelines of cooperation between the contracting parties,
stressing equality between the Contracting Parties and the sovereign right of
each party to set its own policy options." Portions of the acquis, carried
over into Lomd IV, are excerpted below and account for much of the salutary
"tone" of the convention.
Lomn IV and Polycentric Development
In this section of the article specific Lomd IV provisions will be informed,
where appropriate, by a discussion of the earlier conventions and of the
changes and additions over time. The progressive nature and evolution of
EEC-ACP relations will thus be more fully appreciated.
Preliminarily, one may well remark on the fact that Lomd IV is a quite
comprehensive agreement. Discussing each of its many objectives is beyond
the scope of this article, though some of the more important will be
examined. The convention encompasses a host of development concerns 133

130. See Lom6 I, supra note 1, Preamble; Lomd II, supra note 1, Preamble; Lomd III, supra
note 1, art. 3 and Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 1 ("The Contracting Parties hereby express their
resolve to intensify their effort to create, with a view to a more just and balanced international
economic order, a model for relations between developed and developing states .... ")
"The failure of the Convention[s] to lead to this result does not mean that [they] have failed,
rather that other factors, indeed other actors, contributed to the non-emergence of a new international economic order." McMahon, supra note 92, at 149.
131. "In fact the Lorrn Convention performs the function of a demonstration model for both
the E.E.C. member states and other industrialised states. But neither the United States, Japan,
nor others have shown any intention to follow the example given." Benedek, supra note 116,
at 89.

132. According to Professor Simmonds, Lore6 III, art. 2
provided for the political expression within the Convention of an "acquis"
(described during the negotiations as the 'common heritage' of the partners)
progressively built up over twenty-five years of cooperation since the days of the
Implementing Convention attached to the EEC Treaty. The ACP States looked to
such an expression as both an assurance of continuity and a guarantee of their
future treaty relationships with the Community.
Simmonds III, supra note 1, at 394.
133. The areas of ACP/EEC Cooperation are set out in Part Two of Lom6 IV. They are:
Title
Title
Title
Title
Title
Title

I:
II:
III:
IV:
V:
VI:

Environment
Agricultural cooperation, food security, and rural development
Development of fisheries
Cooperation on Commodities
Industrial development, manufacturing and processing
Mining development
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within its 369 articles, not including the numerous annexes and protocols.
The goals are ambitious; most have not been realized. Model or not,
wouldn't it have been better to draft a more modest document which created
less expectations, and therefore would be subject to less criticism in light of
the ACP group's generally poor economic performance?
A former French colonial administrator and a long-time official in the
EEC's Directorate General for Development, Andre Auclert, who has over
30 years experience in development administration, offered a wry view on
this question during an interview given upon his retirement:
Look, to be very frank, I have no qualms in saying that this is the
ACPs' fault. Every five years, from one Convention to another,
they push us to add more.
As a result, we now have a very long list of all the possible uses
of Community aid, particularly the EDF. And when we take
stock of it all in five years time, when we say, negotiate Lomd V,
some people will say-and our friends the [ACP] Ambassadors
are very good at this-'You didn't do this and you didn't do that.
It was in the Convention. It's an oversight.' But it's not. All it
means is that, when we talk more seriously ...

the ACPs know

exactly where their priorities lie, believe you me. The projects
they put forward reflect their top priority needs. So obviously,
compared to the whole string of schemes we could be financing
according to the Convention, there are things that fall by the
wayside-not because they do violence to the Convention, but for
no other reason than that no one applies for projects or financing
to do them."'
Auclert points to external and internal factors along the lines set out earlier
in this paper to explain African underdevelopment. "I don't see why the
ACPs' poor economic situation should be bad publicity for the Lomd

Title
Title
Title
Title
Title
Title

VII:
VIII:
IX:
X:
XI:
XII:

Energy development
Enterprise development
Development of services
Trade development
Cultural and social cooperation
Regional cooperation

Not all of these areas can be fully developed below. Certainly some topics which are not
discussed here, such as regional cooperation, MINEX, industrial development, and development

of services, would appear in any comprehensive treatment of Lom6 IV's provisions.
134. A Talk with Andri Auclert, The Courier, No. 116, July-Aug., 1989, at 7, 8 [hereinafter

Auclert]. Auclert takes particular pride in having introduced the funding of microprojects into
Lom6 I. For more on microprojects, see Is Small Beautiful: Microprojects Assessed, The
Courier, No. 118, Nov.-Dec., 1989, at 14.
"[Flor hundreds of village communities
microprojects represent the first direct benefit form Official Development Aid." Id. at 15. The
provisions relating to microprojects under Lomd are set out in arts. 252 and 253.
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Convention. [W]ithout the Convention, the situation would be an awful lot
This sentiment is expressed frequently in reply
worse than it is now.""
to criticism of Lomd's modest achievements to date." Far from being bad
publicity, Former Commissioner for Development Lorenzo Natali has said
that Lomd "makes an essential contribution to the Community's image in the
world, both quantitatively and qualitatively."13
The continued willingness of the EEC to enter into an arrangement subject
to almost certain criticism, must be taken as evidence to some commitment
to what has been called the "spirit" of Lomd. 13 The best means of getting
a sense of this spirit is through an examination of some of Lomd's more
remarkable provisions. Examining the performance of certain Lomd
development mechanisms will likewise highlight the criticisms that frequently
appear in the literature.
The Preamble to Lomd IV sets the unique tenor of the agreement."' As
noted earlier, this language is not simply a rote carry-over from Lomd I, but
has evolved over time. Negotiated "on the basis of complete equality
between [EEC and ACP] partners and in their mutual interest," the contracting parties of Lom6 IV are
[r]esolved to step up their common efforts to contribute towards
international cooperation and to the solution of international
problems of economic, social, intellectual and humanitarian
nature, in conformity with the aspirations of the international
community towards the establishment of a new, more just and
more balanced world order .... 140
Lomd IV's Part One, excerpted in the introduction to this article, picks up
and elaborates on these themes. In particular, it labels as "fundamental
principles" "the equality between [the] partners, respect for their sovereignty,
mutual interest and interdependence" and "the right of each State to
determine its own political, social, cultural and economic policy options. " 141 "The ACP States shall determine the development principles,
strategies and models for their economies and societies in all sovereign-

135. Auclert, supra note 134, at 7.

136. See, e.g., Pagni, From Lomi' Ito Lomi IV, The Courier, No. 120, March-April, 1990,
at 17, and ACP/EEC Negotiationsfor Lomni IV: A Spur from the Council of Ministers, The
Courier, No. 116, July-Aug., 1989, Yellow Pages at V.
137. Commission Policy on the new ACP/EEC Convention, The Courier, No. 109, May-June,
1988, Yellow Pages at IV.

138. See infra note 255. See also infra notes 151-52.
139. For details on the complex negotiating process for Lome IV, covering a period of 13
months between October, 1988, and November, 1989, see generally The Structure of ACP/EEC

Negotiations, The Courier, No. 120, March-April, 1990, at 10.
140. Lome, supra note 1, Preamble.
141. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 2.
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ty. " 142

Article 5 places great emphasis on the pursuit of, and cooperation for,
human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. Apartheid and
other forms of discrimination (including gender discrimination) are expressly
condemned. This emphasis on human rights appears repeatedly throughout
the convention.1'
Popular participation in development also receives special attention. "The
role and potential of initiatives taken by individuals and groups shall also be
recognized and fostered in order to achieve in practice real participation of
the population in the development process . . . ..
," Likewise, Article 13
provides that the parties shall "encourage participation by the population in
the design and execution of development operations.""1
EDF resources may be used to decentralize development, making available
funds for rural and village groupings, cooperatives, and non-governmental
development organizations and others who "wish to make their own
spontaneous and original contribution to the development of the ACP
states""
"provided they correspond with priorities, guidelines and
development methods adopted by the ACP states."147 This emphasis on the
participation of non-governmental groups-frequently referred to as the
economic, social and cultural groups-appears repeatedly throughout the
convention.'"
This is a most interesting and innovative area of the present convention,
building on terms contained in its predecessor agreements.149 Cultural
cooperation first debuted as part of the acquis of Lom6 III. Economic and

142. Lomd IV, supra note 1, art. 3.
143. See, e<g., Lomd IV, supra note 1, Annex IV, Annex V, and Annex VI. See also arts.
13, 17, 42,
, 121, 139, and 143.
144. Lond IV, supra note 1, art. 5-1.
145. Lomd IV, supra note 1, art. 13.
146. Lomd IV, supra note 1, arts. 20, 22.
147. Lomd IV, supra note 1, art. 21.
148. See, e.g., Lomd IV, supra note 1, arts. 111, 139, 144, 151, and 343.
149. It is also an idea which is spreading among the peoples of the South:
Popular organizations are taking on ecological destruction, inequitable control over
resources and land, and governments' inability to advance the quality of life.
Many citizens' groups are pushing for a central role in development-a concept
they do not measure solely in terms of economic growth. At the core of almost
all these movements lies an emphasis on participation of members in initiating and
implementing plans, and in exercising control over their own lives.
Broad, Cavanagh & Bello, supra note 33, at 153.
The authors describe these groups as "people the development establishment rarely contacts
and whose voices are seldom heard." Id. at 145. Listening to what they say, according to the
authors, will lead to "a new kind of development." Id.
If Lom6 IV means what it says, it means to listen. Given that each succeeding convention
strengthens and expands upon provisions designed to accomplish this goal, at a minimum it
means to try.
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1
social group contact was permissive even earlier, beginning with Lomd I.
LomE fI charged the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers to "take all necessary
measures to establish ongoing contacts between the economic and social
sectors in the Community and in the ACP States and to arrange regular
consultations with their representatives on matters of mutual interest...
"151

Annual meetings between the Community and ACP economic and social
sectors date back at least fourteen years. These exchanges are invaluable
because they contribute to what has been called "polycentric cooperation, i.e.
cooperation which function[s] through a wide variety of public and private
152
bodies and which [keeps] as close to its beneficiaries as possible."
Exchanges at these meetings can be refreshingly frank.153 At one such
meeting, discussing training cooperation, an African participant commented
that training had to be "appropriate" and "pointed to the situation in his
country where many who were highly educated (graduates, lawyers) were
needing to be re-trained as farmers, because other avenues offered no hope
of earning their living."" Another comment, from a Nigerian, added a
blunt addition to the usual list of reasons for the ACPs' lack of appeal for

150. Lom6 I, supra note 1, art. 168.
151. Lom6 III, supra note 1, art. 23-2(h). Articles 20 and 30-2(h) of the present convention
have added cultural groups to the list. For more information on the ACP/EEC Council of
Ministers, see infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
152. Trainingand Commodities: Development Prioritiesfor the Social Partners, The Courier,
No. 119, Jan.-Feb., 1990, at 7.
Polycentric cooperation has support in the Commission, as well. Former Vice-President of
the Commission and Commissioner for Development, Lorenzo Natali, speaking before a meeting
of the ACP/EEC Joint Assembly (discussed below) attached particular importance to the notion
because "everyone's ideas and energy are needed in development." ACP/EEC Joint Assembly
for a Convention in Tune with the 71rues, The Courier, No. 109, May-June, 1988, Yellow Pages
at II.
Funds have been earmarked in Lom6 IV to strengthened polycentric cooperation. European
Communities-Council, Annual Report of the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers 18 (1989).
153. Members of the ACP/EEC social partners do not hesitate to criticize their governments
or Lom6 itself. "The Convention was a 'government to government or civil service to civil
service affair' declared a European employers' representative" in the course of demands to be
a part of the negotiation and implementation for Lom6 IV. 12th Annual Meeting of the Social
Partners: A 'Genuine Participation in the Implementation of Lomn', The Courier, No. 114,
March-April, 1989, at 7. The requirement in Lom6 IV for social and cultural elements in
project design contained can be said to respond to these demands. (art. 142)
Polycentric or "decentralized" cooperation also receives detailed attention in Lom6 IV.
Article 343 charges the Council of Ministers to
organize contacts between the relevant organizations in the Community and the
ACP States (decentralized public authorities and unofficial bodies) to examine in
practical terms how and under what conditions their initiatives can be organized,
with a view to contributing to the pursuit of the development objectives of the ACP
states.
Article 343 specifically addresses improved access of decentralized parties to information on
ACP development policies and ACP/EEC cooperation operations.
154. 12th Annual Meeting of the Social Partners:A 'Genuine Participationin the Implementation of Lomd', The Courier, No. 114, March-April, 1989, at 6.
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foreign investors: "We Africans have for long disdained manual labour." 155
Yet another participant at one of these meetings, a woman from a Rwanda
cooperative group, commented on a proposed article in Lomd IV on the
training of women, expressing hope that it would be adopted: "It is well
known that if you educate a woman, you educate a family.""
A renewed emphasis on cultural exchanges also evidences the continuing
vitality of the Lomd arrangements. The provisions of Lomd III addressing
cultural concerns have been strengthened in the new convention. Some may
scoff at the attention received by these concerns here but it is a not
unimportant matter to the ACP group and of no small value in the effort to
enlighten and culturally enrich the populations of Europe.
As stated in Lomd IV's Article 145, "[i]ntercultural dialogue [is] geared to
more thorough knowledge and a better understanding of cultures. By
clearing obstacles to intercultural communication, cooperation shall stimulate
awareness of the interdependence of peoples of different cultures." "The
Parties shall each for its own part strive to root this notion of interdepenopinion."1 57 Project design must include social and cultural
dence in public
58
evaluations.
Funding for the ACP/EEC Foundation for Cultural Cooperation is also
provided." 9 This important institution has a rather broad mandate, as this
excerpt from an article authored by a Commission official makes clear:
The word "culture" was long seen in a restrictive light, as
referring to the production and enjoyment of works of intellectual
and artistic endeavour.
Today, culture is taken to mean the interaction between man and
his environment and, seen in this light, it is a way of being aware
of reality, a code, a set of different kinds of rules whereby the
individual can communicate with his ecosystem and establish
relations to suit his aims.
Cultural cooperation is part of all ACP/EEC cooperation aimed at
promoting more autonomous and self-sustaining development in
the ACP States by placing man at the centre of the process. By
adopting this theme in the convention, both the ACPs and the

155. Social and Economic PartnersDebate Private Investment, The Courier, No. 107, Jan.Feb, 1988, Yellow Pages at IV.
156. Training and Commodities: Development Prioritiesfor the Social Partners, The Courier,
No. 119, Jan.-Feb., 1990, at 6.
Lom6 IV does indeed contain detailed provisions on women in development, including
providing access to, and funding for, training and education. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 153.
157. Lom6 VI, supra note 1, Annex 11.
158. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, arts. 140, 142 & 143.
159. Lom6 IV, supra note 1,Annex XXII.
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Community were anxious to recognize that autonomous, selfsustaining development meant that the ACP countries had to be
freed from the western cultural model where it was ill-suited to
the realities of the local situation."W
There is, not surprisingly, tension arising out of this area. Two examples
will suffice. Speaking at an ACP/EEC Cultural Foundation-sponsored
seminar, Isaac Nguema, President of the African Commission on Human
Rights and People's Rights, gave a glum assessment on human rights in
Africa, "a continent where personal initiatives are rare, and the will to act
with a sense of responsibility absent."161 President Nguema, playing
devil's advocate, stressed that the notion of Western civil and political rights
has as its heritage the religious tradition of man created in the image of
God."
African animism has no such conception, and traditional societies
are largely governed by kinship ties and group relationships which subordinate the individual." Illiteracy is also a major impediment to creating
awareness of human rights among in Africa. This naturally provoked a
lively debate with the European participants at the seminar.'

160. Aliba, ACP/EEC Cultural Cooperationunder Lomi III, The Courier, No. 115, May-June,
1989, at 7. Over the four year period of 1985-1989 about 60 cultural schemes received funding
of ECU 4.4 million. Id. These included sending a Lesotho teachers' choir to Wales, financing
the training of art restorers from French-speaking Africa, book publishing, and numerous media
projects. Id. at 9.
For an indication that Europeans have appropriated a genuine understanding of the idea, see
infra note 164.
161. Specificity and Universality in Human Rights, The Courier, No. 114, March-April, 1989,
at 9.

162. Id. at 10.
163. For more on animism, see Nkuissi, Religion in Africa, The Courier, No. 123, Sept.-Oct.,
1990, at 83, and Parrinder, The Religions of Africa, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, supra
note 13, at 90.
164. Commission officials have shown remarkable sensitivity on the general questions of
human rights and democracy. In an February, 1990 interview, Manuel Mauin, EEC VicePresident and Development Commissioner was asked if he was "shocked by the Joint Assembly
[discussed below] having ACP representatives who are not MPs?" His answer:
No, I'm not, not at this stage in Africa's institutional development. You can't
lump countries which were only decolonised a short time ago together with those
with well-oiled structures and hundreds of years of experience-and what
experience! Because we are highly satisfied to be Europeans now, we should
never forget that the shaping of Europe involved what were sometimes horrible
wounds. I think we have to see all that in its historical perspective.
Now I've just returned from Mozambique. I talked about institutional and political
matters with President Chissan, who is going to call free elections ... and we
spent some time quietly discussing whether a single party or a multi-party system
could be applied in a country which you knew to contain something like 60
different cultural and tribal organisations. Age, the village elders, women and
children all have a cultural part to play and it not that same part they would have
in Europe. So people will react maybe in the light of instruments and views of life
which do not specifically tally with the way we see our democratic system--which
is not to say that there will not, practically speaking, be a place for human rights,
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The ACP declaration on the return or restitution of cultural property urges
"the Community and its Member States, insofar as they acknowledge the
legitimate right of the ACP States to cultural identity, to promote the return
or restitution of cultural property taken from ACP States and now found in
Member States."" 6 Clearly there is friction on this issue as the ACP
group was unable to obtain a binding Lomd IV provision to require the
return cultural treasures in Member States.
Enough has probably been said regarding the important "aspirational"
aspects of Lomd IV and the participation of non-governmental groups in the
development process. This, along with the section on joint ACP/EEC
institutions which immediately follows, constitutes much of the "good news"
in Lom IV. Attention must also, however, be given to the mechanisms in
the areas of trade, aid, and finance, and to an evaluation of their performance. As shall be seen, there the news is not uniformly good.
ACP/EECJoint Institutions
Lom6 IV ACP/EEC institutions consist of the Council of Ministers, the
Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Assembly. 1" Each institution
lays down its own rules of procedure. Disputes are resolved by Lom6's
highest institution, the Council of Ministers, with provision being made for
binding arbitration where the Member States and the ACP States are unable
to agree. The Member States receive technical support from the Commission. For their part, the ACP countries have organized an ACP Secretariat,
headquartered in Brussels, pursuant to treaty. Taken together, the above has
been praised as "a network of institutions representing the [ACP/EEC]
partners and aimed at keeping the system turning over on the basis of permanent negotiation. . . making ACP/EEC collaboration more open than most
other cooperation policies."167

The ACP/EEC Council of Ministers consists of members of the Council of
European Communities and the Commission of the European Communities,
for respect for life and freedom, for the right to travel freely, to enter and leave
a country and to have your own ideas and not be followed by the police, and so

on . .. these are things which can perfectly well be maintained. The only thing
is that application and the definition of the institutions will be expressed differently.
165. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, Annex XXlV.
166. See infra notes 167-83 and accompanying text.
16.7. Bouvier, What to Expect from Lom? Neither the Best Nor the Worst, The Courier, No.
113, Jan.-Feb., 1989, at 13.
At a meeting of ACP/EEC trade union organizations in Dakar, "the participants stress[ed]
unanimously that the Lom6 Convention is unique, as a model for organized and institutionalised
North-South cooperation with both parties on an equal footing." ACP/EEC Trade Union
OrganisationsMeet in Dakar, The Courier, No. 113, Jan.-Feb., 1989, at V.
During the periodic renegotiations of the convention, the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers, the
Commission (which is delegated the authority to negotiate on behalf of the Member States), and
the ACP Ambassadors all play a role. See The Structure of ACP/EEC Negotiations, The
Courier, No. 120, March-April, 1990, at 10.
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on the European side, and a member of the government of each ACP State,
on the other." It acts by agreement between the Community on the one
hand and the ACP States on the other. 1" Its functions include interpreting
and implementing the terms of the convention, mediating disputes between
the Contracting Parties," and fostering consultations with the economic
and social sectors of the Contracting Parties."' Its decisions are binding
on the Contracting Parties."
The ACP/EEC Committee of Ambassadors is a subordinate institution,
composed of each Member State's Permanent Representative to the European
Communities and one representative of the Commission, on the one hand,
and the head of each ACP State's mission to the European Communities, on
It may submit proposals to the Council of Ministers sua
the other27
sponte or as a result of a delegation by the Council of Ministers and is
charged with monitoring the implementation of the convention and supervising the standing and ad hoc committees. 7 4
The ACP/EEC Joint Assembly is Lomd IV's consultative body, 75
composed of equal numbers of, on the one hand, members of the European
Parliament and, on the other, of members of parliament or, failing this, of
In addition to its
representatives 176 designated by the ACP States.'
consultative function, it too is charged with organizing regular contacts with
representatives of the economic, cultural and social development bodies in
the ACP States and the Community.1 78

168. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 30-1.
169. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 338.
170. See also Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 352, which provides for compulsory arbitration in
the event of deadlock.
171. Lor6 IV, supra note 1, arts. 30-2, 342 & 343.
172. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 342.
173. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 31-1.
174. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, arts. 31-2 & 346.
175. Among the functions of the Joint Assembly is to "seek, through dialogue, debate and
concerted action, to:
*

promote better understanding between the peoples of the Member States and the ACP
States;

"

promote public awareness of the interdependence of the peoples and of their interests

"
*

*

as well as the need for solidarity in development;
reflect upon all matters pertaining to ACP/EEC cooperation, particularly the
fundamental problems of development;
encourage research and initiative, and formulate proposals with a view to improving
and reinforcing ACP/EEC cooperation; [and]

urge the relevant authorities of the Contracting Parties to implement this Convention
in the most efficient manner possible so as to ensure the full attainment of its objectives ....

Lomd
176.
177.
178.

"

IV, supra note 1, art. 32-2(a).
See supra note 164.
Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 32-1.
Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 32.
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The Joint Assembly often serves the useful function of "creating a political
climate where difficult decisions may more easily be taken" regarding, for
example, such issues as the movement of hazardous and radioactive wastes
and the plight of internally displaced persons."
These are topics that
governments, for various political and economic reasons, may prefer to
overlook. The Joint Assembly can also give Commission officials political

cover when they attempt to take the Member States further than they may
otherwise want to go on a given issue."80
ACP/EEC institutions, not surprisingly, do have their critics. Essentially
they point to inherently unequal bargaining power, lack of ACP technical
capabilities, and other institutional asymmetries.""

admit as much."

Commission officials

There is, however, no significant evidence of bad faith

179. The Madrid Joint Assembly: All Eyes on 'Lomi IV', The Courier, No. 112, Nov.-Dec.,
1988, Yellow Pages at VI.
At the Madrid meeting there was a heated exchange on the export of EEC toxic wastes to the
ACP. Although the EEC representative protested that EEC directives already required shipments to be "justified" and the consignee be capable of disposing of the waste, many members
from both EEC and ACP nations urged an outright ban on such shipments. They pointed out
that "the rules are not always respected, and unprincipled companies exploiting the poor and the
ignorant [here one could add 'and the corrupt'] can put countries and their populations at serious
health and environmental risk." Id. at IX.
Lom6 IV has put into place new provisions which effectively ban the movement of hazardous
and radioactive waste between the Community and the ACP states "without prejudice to specific
international undertakings to which the Contracting Parties have subscribed or may subscribe .
• . within the competent international fora." Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 39. Each signatory
to the convention undertakes to ratify the Basle Convention on the Control of Tranaboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, Annex IX.
A report originating in the Joint Assembly likewise drew attention to displaced persons:
The report [on Refugees and Displaced Persons] laid particular stress on displaced
persons, who, unlike refugees, had no official status, and whose plight-because
it was often considered to be a temporary phenomenon-was accorded low
priority. [Displaced persons] had not been covered by the provisions of Lomd III,
and should be by those of the successor Convention.
Lomd IV, like its predecessors, provides funds for emergency assistance. Lom6 IV, supra
note 1, arts. 254-257. In addition to the familiar provisions for aid in case of "serious economic
and social difficulties ... resulting from natural disasters or extraordinary circumstances having
comparable effects" (Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 254) and aid for refugees and returnees, Loni
IV now funds efforts to integrate or reintegrate internally displaced persons due to conflicts or
natural disasters. Lomd IV, supra note 1, art. 255. ECU 350m ($472.5 million) has been put
aside in the EDF for these purposes. Lom6 IV, supra note, Financial Protocol.
180. See infra note 255.
181. See, e.g., Gruhn, supra note 8, at27.
182.
It is not easy to discuss the terms of cooperation and implement this cooperation
on a truly equal footing when on the one hand you have wealthy countries with
room for manoeuvre and, on the other, much poorer countries that are often in the
grip of intolerable economic and social pressures. However, the mere fact that we
negotiate the terms of cooperation, "group to group," is in itself a guarantee and
gives you a chance to present your points of view and interests. The continuity of
our relations and the security derived from the fact that our cooperation is codified
in a treaty constitute further guarantees ....

From an address of Manuel Matin, Vice-President of the Commission and Development
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on the part of the EEC. To the contrary, many of the problems are simply
reflections of the verity that twelve relatively homogenous countries often are
able to present a more united front than sixty-nine more varied nations can
normally achieve. Over time the increasing sophistication of ACP organizational capacities" s and the refinement of provisions regarding operations of the joint institutions have alleviated some of the concerns. The best
evidence of this is the convention itself, particularly in terms of its increased
transparency, better dispute resolution mechanisms, and increasingly
favorable financial provisions.
Trade Cooperation
The Lom trade provisions have always constituted a vital part of
ACP/EEC cooperation, though they have been criticized by some academics
and non-ACP developing countries as divisive to South-South cooperation.' " Moreover, as shall be seen, the Lomd trade regime has failed to
promote overall growth in ACP trade with the Community.
As indicated above, Lom departed from the principles of reciprocity that
were a hallmark of the earlier Yaounde agreements-there are no requirements for reverse preferences in Lomd. Products originating in the ACP
States, including manufactured goods and textiles, enter the Community free
of customs duties and, in most instances, quantitative restrictions. 18 Not
surprisingly, certain agricultural products are excluded consistent with the
EEC Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)."
The CAP protects European agricultural production by the general
imposition of one or a combination of variable levies and other customs
duties, quantitative restrictions, and/or export subsidies. The CAP has been
a primary source of contention in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.'" Even in this area, however, the ACP group benefits from more
favorable treatment than other third country exporters."'8 Quotas have
been extended for ACP beef and veal, with an increase of almost 25% over
Lomd III allowances. Quotas for bananas,1' 9 sugar," 9 and rum 9 ' are

Commissioner to the ACP Council of Ministers in 1989, excerpted in To Act Effectively We
Must Have a Clear View of the Main Issues, The Courier, No. 114, March-April, 1989, Yellow
Pages at III.
183. The 1980s has been called "the decade which saw the rise of the ACP Group and its
emergence as a major organisation on the international scene...." Traore, Many a Challenge
for the ACPs, The Courier, No. 120, March-April, 1990, at 19.
184. Benn, The Commonwealth Caribbean and the New International Economic Order, in
DEPENDENCY UNDER CHALLENGE: THE POLITiCAL ECONOMY OF THE COMMONWEALTH

CARIBBEAN 264 (Payne & Sutton eds. 1984).
185. Lomd IV, supra note 1, arts. 168 & 169.
186. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, at 168-2(a).
187. GATrReprived, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 15.
188. See supra notes 182-184 and accompanying text.
189. Lomd, supra note 1, Protocol 5.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol22/iss1/2

42

Matthews: Lomé IV and ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost Decade

1991]

LOMi IV AND

ACP/EEC RELATIONS

also in place and are designed to protect traditional EEC markets for the
ACP suppliers of these products. Mechanisms are also available for the
admission of certain other important agricultural products, such as strawberries, tomatoes, molasses, and sorghum, particularly during the off-season in
Europe. Where the CAP imposes a duty, but no quantitative restriction on

agricultural imports, ACP products enter duty-free."
Notwithstanding the very liberal provisions for ACP exports to the
Community, the trend in ACP/EEC trade has been negative."m In 1970,
for instance, the ACP share, in monetary terms, of EEC total imports was
8.3%. 9 The comparable figure for 1985 had dropped to 4%.195 The
percentage of ACP participation in EEC imports from all developing
countries has also declined from 20% in 1975 to 15% in 1987.19 Studies
confirm a general decline in ACP exports of semi-manufactured, manufactured and agricultural products from ACP countries.l" Nevertheless, the
Community annually absorbs an average of about 55% of total ACP
exports.'"
A number of reasons have been advanced for these circumstances,
including the ubiquitous phenomenon of the declining terms of trade. In
1988, prices for non-petroleum commodities, constituting upwards of 80%
of ACP exports, were at about 60% of their prices in the early seventies."m
Another consideration also previously discussed is the disincentives to foreign
investment due to both internal (unfavorable domestic policy regimes) and
external (high debt service ratios and current account imbalances leading to
foreign exchange shortages) causes.'
What little industry exists is
notoriously uncompetitive, as Community officials often point out."

190. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, Sugar Protocol.
191. Id. Protocol 6.
192. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 168-2(a)(ii).
193. Watkins, supra note 17, at 40.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 41.
197. Effects and Prospects of EEC/ACP Trade and Trade Policy Relations, The Courier, No.
98, July-Aug., 1986, at 62.
198. There is some evidence of structural changes in ACP trade and rather substantial increases
in certain processed goods, mainly textiles, processed tropical products, and wood and leather
products. Recalling that ACP countries started from a practically non-existent industrial base,
it is significant that these and other processed products now constitute about 8% of ACP exports.
It is also significant that these products benefit from exemptions to the high MFN tariff rates
under GAIT. Watkins, supra note 17, at 41.
199. Gakunu, Difficulties of StructuralAdjustment Policies, The Courier, No. 111, Sept.-Oct.,
1988, at 75, citing World Bank figures.
200. See Dossier: Investment in ACP States, The Courier, March-April, 1987, at 70.
201. "The real problem with ACP/EEC trade," according to former Commissioner for
Development Lorenzo Natali in a speech made in October, 1988, "does not lie in the trade
arrangements under the Convention but in the competitiveness of the ACP countries." 'Inventing
the Future': Opening of the Negotiations for the Renewal of the ACPIEEC Convention, The
Courier, No. 112, Nov.-Dec., 1988, Yellow Pages at V.
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Some ACP officials' admit that competitiveness is a problem, but also
point to the absolute decline in foreign investment in ACP states, European
(agricultural) subsidies and the dilution of ACP preferences through the
extension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), discussed below.
Whatever the cause for declining export capacity, at a seminar on trade
issues held in 1990, a delegate from Cote d'Ivoire dryly summed up the
problem for ACPs: "There [is] no point in having access to a market...
unless you have something to sell."'
The introduction and gradual extension of the Community's GSP has
considerably eroded ACP preferences. Indeed, only about one-third.of ACP
products (primarily agricultural produce and fish) enjoy real advantages due
to the Lomd preferences.'
The remaining two-thirds would enter dutyfree in any event.'
ACP countries must compete with other developing
countries in the EEC market for these GSP products. Studies have shown
that "the tariff preferences the ACPs get are, in relation to the GSP,
generally inadequate to direct trade patterns on their own.""
They are
nonetheless significant, particularly for sensitive products (such as preserves
and textiles), because ACP countries are not subject to GSP quantitative
restrictions placed on non-ACP developing countries.
The value of the preferences to the ACP group are virtually impossible to
measure since there is no obvious answer to the following question: But for
the trade preferences, what would the level of ACP/EEC trade be? Phrased
another way, what is the competitive advantage, where the preferential
margin is "efficient" and helps to boost the volume of ACP exports over
competitors, for the one-third of ACP imports which in fact benefit from

At the Joint Assembly meeting in Madrid earlier in September, he used almost the same
words: "The real problem of ACP/EEC trade lies not in market access but in the capacity to
export and the competitivity (sic) of the ACP States; free market access is already practically
total...." The MadridAssembly: All Eyes on "Lora IV," The Courier, No. 112, Nov.-Dec.,
1988, Yellow Pages at VII.
202. Lomd IV: ACP/EEC Council of Ministers in Brazavlle-Political Go-Ahead for the
Negotiations, The Courier, No. 114, March-April, 1989, Yellow Pages at I.
203. Syrposium: Trade Issues in the Context of LomJ IV and 1992, The Courier, No. 123,
Sept.-Oct., 1990, at 6.
As Girard rightly points out,
[o]veral, the greatest obstacle to effective use of the Lom6 market access
provisions is the economic structure of the ACP states. Unless substantial
structural transformations are achieved through increased investments in plants and
equipment, ACP producers will remain unable to penetrate EEC markets.
To exploit the trade preferences granted under the Lom6 convention, the ACP
states must attract foreign investment or induce efficient domestic investment in
manufacturing sectors.
Girard, supra note 78, at 478.
204. The LomJ Trade Arrangements: What Do They Dofor the ACPs?, TheCourier, No. 109,
May-June, 1988, at 5.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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favorable Community customs treatment? No study has been located that
answers this question. Still, "[in 1989 the ACP received ECU 1,700m.
[$2.295 billion] in aid from the [E]EC through the EDF. In the same year,
trade with the Community was worth approximately ECU 30,000m. [$40.5
billion]."
There is, in addition, understandable concern on the ACP side that global
tariff reductions negotiated in the Uruguay Round of the GATT will further
erode those meaningful ACP preferences that do exist.'
While the
Community attempts to soothe the ACP group by pointing out the additional
markets that such global reductions would entail, the ACP group is not
comforted.'
The ACP countries have, undoubtedly, taken certain
satisfaction from the recent temporary collapse and proposed two-year
extension of these negotiations.
In the negotiations leading up to Lomd IV the ACP states sought to receive
some form of commitment from the Community to (1) either preserve its
preferential standing vis-a-vis third countries or (2) to receive compensation
through "special arrangements" for their most important exports.2 10 The
Community response was that "it had never committed itself to maintaining
the preferential margin for ACP products on its markets."2" In the end the
Community did agree to a vaguely worded provision set out in Annex XXIX
in the Lomd IV, noting that it "is conscious of the need to ensure, in the
overall application of the Convention, the maintenance of the competitive
position of the ACP States where their advantages on the Community market
are affected by measures relating to general trade liberalization." 2
Through what mechanisms and to what extent the "competitive position"
of ACP exports will be supported remains an open question. Earlier, an
Commission official dismissed a suggestion of quotas at guaranteed prices,
with automatic compensation for price declines, as "totally unrealistic." 1
The ACP states have, nevertheless, recently pointed to Annex XXIX in

207. Watkins, supra note 17, at 41.

208. European Communities-Council, supra note 152, at 19. See also Lom' IV: ACPIEEC
Council of Ministers in Brazzaville-PoliticalGo-Aheadfor the Negotiations, The Courier, No.
114, March-April, 1989, Yellow Pages at II.
209. Id. A study subsequently commissioned by the ACP Council of Ministers estimates losses
of between US $118 million to $121 million annually if trade in tropical products is liberalized
as a result of the Uruguay Round. Fifty-First Session of the ACP Council of Ministers: Seeking
Satisfaction on Trade, The Courier, No. 125, Jan.-Feb., 1991, Yellow Pages at II.
210. ACP/EEC Negotiationsfor Lom IV: A Spurfrom the Council of Ministers, The Courier,
No. 116, July-Aug., 1989, Yellow Pages at I, II.
211. Id.
212. Annex XXIX.
213. The Madrid Joint Assembly: All Eyes on 'Lomt' IV', The Courier, No. 112, Nov.-Dec.,
1988, Yellow Pages at VI, IX.
According to another Commission official, "'[a] Sugar-Protocol-type solution for tropical
products might involve isolating the EEC-ACP zone from the outside world ... which is not
feasible.'" ACP/EEC Negotiationsfor 'Lond IV': Hoping to do Better, The Courier, No. 115,
May-June, 1989, Yellow Pages at I.
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renewing their demands for compensation for losses due to trade liberalization.21 '
The topic of trade cannot be left without comment on two additional Lom6
215 and the safeguard clause. 216
IV trade provisions: the rules of origin
Both are well-known devices in trade agreements and so will not be analyzed
in detail here. Lomd IV does, however, make concessions to the ACP states
concerning these matters. The improvements over previous accords should
be mentioned.
Rules of origin are principally meant to prevent third countries from
'jumping' trade barriers by moving assembly operations into countries
benefitting from a trade preference for the good in question. Lom6's rules
of origin, since it used its own system of nomenclature, had been criticized
by business as difficult to use. Lomd IV now bases its system on the popular
Harmonized System of Nomenclature and is therefore cdnsiderably more
transparent. 1 7 The ACP states are treated as a single customs territory.
The margin of tolerance for non-originating goods
(i.e., non-ACP or EEC
21
goods) has been doubled to 10% under Lomd IV. 1
Most importantly, the system for obtaining derogations from the rules of
origin has been improved. It had been at least theoretically possible for an
ACP producer to receive such a derogation, but many claim that the
Community stonewalls these requests, making business planning difficult or
impossible and frustrating investment. Under Lomd IV, if the EEC fails to
respond within three months, derogations will be deemed approved. 19
Much ink has been spilled on Lomd's safeguard clause,' though no
safeguard measures have ever been invoked against ACP products in Lom6's
fifteen year history.221 It is no doubt easier for ACP officials and academic
critics alike to enter into a wailing and gnashing of teeth over the issue than
to propose methods of fostering productive capacity sufficient for ACP
enterprises to pose a real threat of causing "serious disturbances" in the
EEC's domestic economy. Moreover, voluntary export restraints (VERs),
notorious devices imposed on trading partners to avoid the invocation of
GATT safeguards, have apparently only been complained of one time in

214. Fifty-First Session of the ACP Council of Ministers: Seeking Satisfaction on Trade, The
Courier, No. 125, Jan.-Feb., 1991, Yellow Pages at I.
215. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, Protocol 1.
216. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, arts. 177-180 and Protocol 4.
217. Details on PrincipalDevelopments and Innovations, The Courier, No. 120, Mar.-Apr.
1990, at 16.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Girard, supra note 78.
221. For a general treatment of safeguard clauses, see Koekkoek, Safeguards and the
Developing Countries' Interests in the Uruguay Round, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EXISTING
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTIVE SOLUTIONS 106-120 (Fatemi ed. 1989).
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Lomd's history."
rules'

EEC negotiators agreed to subject the area to new

which include statistical surveillance and regular consultations.

Protocol 4 appears carefully designed to ensure that safeguards are put into
place only when Community allegations of serious disruptions are sustainable.
Development Finance Cooperation

Development finance cooperation is governed by the lengthy provisions set
out in Title III of Lomd IV, which must be read in conjunction with its

Financial Protocol. At the outset of each convention the Community
announces the amount of development financing available to the individual
ACP states out of the total available funds set out in the Financial Protocol.
The ACP states then formulate an "indicative programme" to take advantage
of the assistance.'
Initial coordination between the EEC and ACP
country concerned is handled within each ACP country. The EEC is

represented in each ACP State by its Delegate, with significant powers, who
must be approved by the country concerned.'
The broad objectives of Lom6 development finance are set out in Article
220. Fundamental among these objectives is the "self-determined, selfreliant, and self-sustained" development of the ACP states. Included in
Article 220 are pledges to facilitate an increase in official and private
financial flows, to promote intra-ACP cooperation and regional cooperation,

to provide emergency relief from natural disasters, and to assist the ACP
group to innovate, adapt and transform technology. Technical assistance is
provided only at the request of an ACP State, with a corresponding pledge
222. This was in the case of Mauritian textiles going into the U.K. in the early 1980s.
Ravenhill, supra note 9, at 40-41.
223. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, Protocol 4.
224. A complete description and evaluation of the effectiveness of national indicative programs
is beyond the scope of this article.
For the example of national indicative programs in the Gambia, see The Gambia-EEC
Cooperation, The Courier, No. 119, Jan.-Feb., 1990, at 26. Funding trends in that country are
instructive regarding Lom6 trends as a whole. These trends reflect a shift away from project
funding in multiple sectors under Lomds I and II toward sectoral funding under LOME III.
Beginning with Lom6 III an increasing effort was focused on food security and rural development.
In the Gambia, the principal project funding under Lomd I was Gambia College, now the
country's highest educational and training institution. Under Lom6 II, the largest expenditure
was for a sewage project in the country's capital. It should be noted that a "microproject" in
the fisheries area (providing facilities and a revolving loan fund to Gambian fishermen) has
received continuous funding under all the conventions.
By Lom6 III, emphasis was shifted from a relatively large number of interventions in
different sectors to a focus on rural development and the environment. The Gambia, with its
heavy dependence on foreign exchange earned from the export of peanuts, has also benefited
substantially from STABEX. Id. at 26-27.
For more on the new emphasis on rural development and food security, see MeNamara, LomJ
If: a Mid-Term Financial Review, The Courier, No. 118, Nov.-Dec., 1989, at 6. See also
Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 15.
225. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, arts. 316 & 317.
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"for rapid and effective training of ACP replacement personnel."' 6
The list of the possible sectors for intervention are numerous and range
from structural adjustment, to measures to save energy, to microprojects for
grassroots development, and beyond.'
A key guideline for cooperation is "the concept of equality between the
partners. .. 2
The ACP countries are generally responsible for defining
their objectives and identifying sectors for intervention, as well as identifying, negotiating, implementing and maintaining the specific projects to be
financed as part of their indicative programs.' 9 Regional groupings, joint
ACP/EEC bodies and, "subject to the agreement of the ACP States,"
national or local public and private entities, including ACP or EEC
enterprises, unions, local communities and cooperatives are also eligible for
support under Lom IV.'
The ACP countries and the Community are jointly responsible for establishing administrative guidelines for development finance cooperation,
adopting the indicative programmes, and monitoring and evaluating the
effects of projects."2 ' Though the partners engage in a structured policy
dialogue 2 (governed by the provisions of arts. 281-287), the Community
retains the ultimate responsibility for taking a financing decision on projects. 3 Ordinarily such decisions must be taken within 120 days of an
ACP request, and there is a provision for the referral of disputes to the
ACP/EEC Development Finance Cooperation Committee or the Community's

226. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 221.
227. Lom6 IV, sra
note 1, art. 229.
228. Lomd IV, supra note I, art. 222-1.
229. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 222-2.
230. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 230.
231. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 222-3.
232. The alert reader will note that "policy dialogue" sounds suspiciously like a euphemism
for "conditionality." Not so. First, it is to be recalled that aid under the Lomd agreement is
an entitlement and, though financing decisions are ultimately made by the Commission,
considerable procedural safeguards exist to prevent arbitrary action on the part of the
Commission. Second, though initial fears of conditionality surfaced at the negotiation and
signing of Lom6 III (which inaugurated policy dialogue), in practice the Commission has shown
deference to ACP priorities and sensitivities.
An astute observer of, by no means an apologist for, Lom6 has described the changes in Lom6
Ill as
intended to provide aid programmes with a more focused approach, enabling the
[EJEC to direct funds where they could be most effectively deployed rather than
merely responding to ACP project 'shopping lists'. This in turn required the
[E]EC to become more closely involved in policy formulation through a process
of dialogue with individual ACP countries.
Policy dialogue was conceived, therefore, as a means by which the [EJEC could
ensure consistency between its aid programme and the broader policies pursued by
recipient governments-a third way between 'rigid conditionality imposed by
financing bodies and the irresponsibility of non-conditionality'
Watkins, supra note 17, at 41.
233. Lomd IV, supra note 1, art. 222-4.
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decision-making body.'
Projects may be financed either by grants or by risk capital from the

EDF, 3z or by loans for the European Investment Bank (EIB).z'
As set
out by the Financial Protocol, a total of ECU 7,995m ($10.95 billion) is
allocated for grant assistance. 7 ECU 825m ($1.13 billion) is earmarked
for risk capital with interest limited to 3%, and ECU 1,200m ($1.64 billion)
from EIB's own resources is set aside for loans to the private sector and
regional development banks. Taking subsidies into account, beneficiaries
will pay interest in the range of 3-6% .238
Lom IV's financial provisions are substantial' and "have gone well
beyond merely allowing for inflation: The overall financial envelope has
increased from ECU 8,500m [under Lomd III] to ECU 12,000m [under
Lomd IV] . . . i.e., an increase of more than 40% in arithmetic terms and

234. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 289.
235. The EDF is made up of contributions from the Twelve. The breakdown of contributions,
expressed in terms of percentages, is as follows:
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Britain

3.96
2.075
25.964
1.284
5.896
24.368
0.549
12.96
0.19
5.568
0.879
16.368

Each member state is assigned a weighted vote on the EDF Committee, which has duties in
three areas: programming, implementation, and project decision-making (for projects exceeding
ECU 2m). Lom /V.- Internal FinancialAgreement, The Courier, No. 124, Nov.-Dec., 1990,

at 6, 7.
236. The EIB was established by the Treaty of Rome to finance long-term investment in EEC
Member Countries. Since the signing of Lom6 I its scope of operations has been broadened to
include the ACP nations. The EIB's operations are examined in detail in Phillippe Tabary, EIB
FinancingArrangements in the ACP States, The Courier, No. 110, July-Aug., 1988, at 7.
The EIB funds larger projects directly and small projects through loans to regional
development banks. It therefore plays a central role in developing so-called "small and mediumsized enterprises" (SMEs). See The European Investment Bank and the SMEs in the ACPs, The
Courier, No. 115, May-June, 1989, at 66.
A marked shift has recently been reported from financing import substitution investments to
export-oriented ventures. Id. at 69.
237. Including funds earmarked for structural adjustment, treated in a separate section, below.
238. Details on PrincipalDevelopments and Innovations, supra note 217, at 14.
239. The EDF is an important source of funds for the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa.
According to an OECD report, in 1986 the EDF provided almost one-quarter of all multilateral
net official development aid to these countries, making it the second largest multilateral donor
(after the IDA). Bouvier, supra note 167, at 11.
For comparative amounts of funds provided by the first through seventh EDFs, as well as a
statistical analysis of the type of aid and sectors assisted, see Hughes, EDF Implementation: The
Latest Position, The Courier, No. 125, Jan.-Feb., 1991, at 12.
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more than 20% in real terms."'
While each successive convention has
provided for absolute increases in aid, Lom IV represents the first time that
a Lom renegotiation has resulted in a real, if modest, per-capita increase in
assistance to the ACP countries.
Lom IV also introduced new emphases in the areas of trade and services,
including tourism" and processing, marketing, distribution, and transport
(PMDT) of primary commodities.4 2 These are aimed at "diversifying the
range and increasing the value and volume of ACP States' trade in goods and
services, " ' as well as "resolving the structural difficulties in many
commodity sectors. " ' No special funds have been earmarked for these
programs, however, and they therefore must be prioritized by the ACPs
themselves in their national indicative programs.
In light of the observations made at the outset regarding the abysmal state
of development in Sub-Saharan Africa and the continuing international
division of labor, the development finance provisions of Lom obviously
have not provided the solution to ACP group's development dilemma. This
was underscored in a remark by Edwin Carrington, recently retired ACP
Secretary-General, when he observed that "25 years of preferential treatment
from the EEC had not enabled a single ACP State to climb into the league
of newly industrialising countries."'
To state the underlying reasons for this lack of success is to restate the
well-worn arguments which attribute the South's lack of development to
various external and/or internal factors. Many in the ACP countries also
fault the volume of aid made available under the various Lomd conventions.'
For the Commission's part, its officials emphasize that Lomd was
not designed and never intended to substitute for self-reliant development in
Sub-Saharan Africa, responsibility for which the conventions had always
placed on the ACPs themselves. 4 7 Moreover, Lom does not operate in
240. European Communities-Council, supra note 152, at 7.
241. See Lee, The Tourism Sector and LomJ IV, The Courier, No. 122, July-Aug., 1990, at
61. See also Lomd IV, supra note 1,arts. 114 and 121.
242. See, e.g., Lom6 IV, supra note 1, arts. 18 and 70.
243. Lomi IV, supra note 1, art. 114.
244. Lomd IV, spra note 1, art. 70.
245. Reported in Fairclough, 1992 and the Caribbean, The Courier, No. 113, Jan.-Feb., 1989,
at 6.

246. The ACPs had wanted a commitment of ECU 15.5 billion for the first five years of Lom6
IV. The final amount agreed to by the Commission, as indicated above, was ECU 12 billion.
Lomni IV Signed, The Courier, No. 119, Jan.-Feb., 1990, Yellow Pages at I.
247. As one academic has written, "EDF- and EIB-financed projects and programmes are, and
can only be, ways of consolidating, diversifying, amplifying and accelerating the development
strategies run by the national Governments." Bouvier, supra note 167, at 11. See also Manin,
supra note 56, at 5.
Development Commissioner Main has suggested that the industrial policies adopted by most
ACP states (not without some urging from capitalist elements in the developed world) were
unsuited to their social and economic environment:
"The accent on project size and

sophisticated equipment is behind over-investment-which is also based on over-optimistic

forecasts that are often backed up by equipment sellers and bankers in the West."
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a vacuum and any meaningful progress in international development, it says,
will not occur outside the context of both broader North/South cooperation
and increased assistance from other multilateral and bilateral donors. 2
The recent decade has seen only static, and often regressive, activity on these
fronts. 9
Cooperationin the Field of Commodities
Lomd's mechanism for the stabilization of commodities export earnings
(STABEX) has been substantially improved over its predecessors. STABEX
has "the aim of remedying the harmful effects of the instability of export
earnings... of products on which their economies are dependent and which
are affected by fluctuations in price or quantity or both these factors."I
Thus STABEX compensates both for general price declines and for
production shortfalls, including those resulting from natural causes, such as
drought or hurricanes. ACP countries, able to rely on predictable export
earnings, are better positioned to avoid disruptions in their development
planning. Payments may, with joint ACP/EEC consultation, be used to
diversify away from reliance on the commodity in question."'
Payments are computed by the difference between actual earnings and
average earnings over the previous six years, less 4.5% of average earnings,
provided a "dependence threshold" (the minimum percentage that a
commodity must constitute of a country's total exports in order to qualify for
payments) of 5% has been met. 2 These figures are down from Lomd I's
7.5% and 7.5% (2.5% and 2.5% for LDLICs). 3
STABEX has been popular with the ACPs, since transfers have been rapid

Assembly Meets in Barbados, The Courier, No. 114, Mar.-April, 1989, at 4, 5-6.
Former Deputy-Director of Development Auclert has also pointed out that "[tihere are turnkey
factory merchants going all over Africa offering the leaders of the countries marvellous (sic)
projects on very harsh financial terms." Auclert, supra note 134, at 8.
248. Taking Stock: The ACP/EEC Council Meets in Mauritius, The Courier, No. 110, JulyAug., 1988, Yellow Pages at II.
249. Development Commissioner Main recently stated that the "raw materials slump and the
debt crisis" are beyond the remit of Lomd. He also pointed out that while there has been a 26%
real increase in the amount of aid under Lom6 IV, comparable World Bank credits, while
showing a 16% increase in absolute terms, had not increased when adjusted for inflation. Joint
Comnittee in Port Moresby-First Meeting in the Pacific, The Courier, No. 121, May-June,
1990, Yellow Pages at II.
250. Lomd IV, supra note 1, art. 186.
251. Lomd IV, supra note 1, art. 209.
252. One percent for least-developed, landlocked and island countries (LDLICs). Lome has
special provisions for least-developed, landlocked and island states (LDLICs) throughout. In
addition, Title IV sets out general provisions regarding LDLICs.
253. Lomd I,supra note 1,arts. 17 and 19.
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and, though heretofore loans, made on highly concessional terms.'
Under Lome IV, STABEX can only increase in popularity, since there is no
longer any requirement to replenish the scheme. 55 Exceeding even the
expectations of ACP optimists, ECU 1,500m ($1.025 billion) has been
allocated to STABEX over the next five years, a whopping 62% increase
over the Lom III allotment.'
STABEX funds are managed by the
Commission.5
Product coverage of STABEX has grown two-fold since Lomd I to include
forty-nine of the most important ACP commodities.5 8
The scheme is
intended to compensate for losses on exports to the EEC only, though a
derogation procedure exists to compensate for losses to other markets,
particularly where LDLICs are involved.'
Some early criticisms of STABEX have been rectified in the later
conventions. One author, for instance, pointed to limited product coverage,
inadequate funding, long delays between requests for transfers and disbursement, arbitrary administration, and no recourse for appeal in the event

254. The EEC has put into place a much more modest STABEX scheme for the commodity
exports of Latin American and Asian least-developed countries to the EEC. The Stabex System
for Latin American and Asian Developing Countries, The Courier, No. 117, Sept.-Oct., 1989,
at 94.
Lom6 I, II, and III used a slightly different formula, still involving reference prices, to
compute payments.
255. STABEX funds had always been grants to LDLICs. Kibola, supra note 50, at 42, had
termed the repayment requirement the "vicious circle of Stabex." Payments for subsequent
years had been withheld to repay earlier advances. The elimination of the requirement to
replenish Stabex eliminates this problem for the future.
As has been noted, ACP debt for total Lom6 benefits (including STABEX) constitutes about
1.5-2.0 percent of total ACP debt to all sources. The present Commission of Development,
Manuel Main, recently recommended to the EEC Council of Ministers that the EEC write off
ECU 1.467 billion in existing ACP debt, and convert loan amounts not yet committed or
disbursed under Lomds I, 11, and III (amounting to some ECU 1.6 billion) into grants.
Pointing out that he had obtained the political support of both the European Parliament and
the ACP/EEC Joint Assembly, he clearly expressed his expectation that the Council of Ministers
would approve this request. 'According to the spirit of the Lomi Convention, the Community
should not be cast simply in the role of creditor but rather that of a co-partner in development."
Main, Writing off the ACP Debt to the EEC, The Courier, No.. 125, Jan.-Feb., 1991, at 9.
It may be fanciful, but one still wonders whether Matin in" making his. recommendation,
considered one of the prophet Habakkuk's five woes directed against nations that plunder
peoples:
Woe to him who heaps up what is not his own-for how long?--and loads himself
with pledges! Will not your debtors suddenly arise, and those awake who will
make you tremble? Then you will be booty for them. Because you have plundered
many nations, all the remnants of the peoples shall plunder you, for the blood of
men and violence to the earth, to cities and all who dwell therein.
Habakkuk 3:6-8
256. Lom6 IV,
257. Lom6 IV,
258. Lomd IV,
259. Lom6 IV,

(King James).
supra note 1, Financial Protocol.
supra note 1, art. 190.
supra note 1, art. 187.
supra note I, art. 189.
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of an adverse Community determination.?
As mentioned above, product
coverage has broadened over time. And, according to a report on a 1990
study, STABEX has actually covered the demands placed upon it for ten of
out of its fourteen years."6 Resources under Lom6 IV are substantially
increased. Tighter deadlines for Community response to ACP requests have
been imposed' and a "good offices" procedure, carried out by an expert
acceptable to both sides, is now available in the event of a dispute.'
Criticisms of STABEX persist. The most damning criticism is that the
scheme contributes to the perpetuation of the historic division of labor
between Europe and Africa in that payments are made only for a limited
number of unprocessed, traditional imports.'
ACP efforts to include
plywood and textiles under Lomd IV, for instance, were rejected.'
This
is somewhat obviated by the ability of ACP states to use STABEX payments
in order to diversify away from the commodities concerned.'
The Community is clearly unwilling to consider what would be an
admittedly extraordinary step: that of stabilizing export earnings for
processed goods. One wonders whether Lom6 IV's provision for the
development of PMDT"7 of commodities will be utilized if the resulting
processed goods are not subject to the protection of STABEX. The circumstances call into question the EEC's continued commitment to meaningfully
advance ACP development.
A second criticism is distributional; some ACP countries benefit much
more than others.'
These criticisms are also leveled at the protocols
covering specific commodities. STABEX payments have, in some cases,
exceeded the EDF allotment of some countries under their national indicative
programs.'
They have been particularly important to those ACP countries producing coffee, groundnuts (peanuts), and cocoa, three commodities
which experienced particularly steep declines in price during the 1980s.'

260. Ravenhill, supra note 9, at 47.
261. STABEX: from LomJ I to Lom III-An Analysis of its Functioning, The Courier, No.
124, Nov.-Dec., 1990, at 8.
262. Lor6 IV, supra note 1, art. 207.
263. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art 208.
264. Gnihn, supra note 8, at 17.
265. Watkins, supra note 17, at 50.
266. Bouvier, supra note 167, at 11, cites a study which surveyed 10 ACPs with a total of 42
STABEX transfers between them. That study concluded that "[tihe vast majority of the funds
obtained through the system were used outside the sector on which the application was based."
d.'
267. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
268. Kibola, supra note 50, at 37. See also Bouvier, supra note 167, at 13: "Records of the
first two Stabexes show that, of the 48 nations eligible, Senegal and Cote d'lvoire between them
received more than a quarter of the transfers and six countries, the two last-named plus Ghana,
Sudan, PNG and Kenya, got more than half."
269. Kibola, supra note 50, at 38.
270. Watkins, supra note 17, at 44.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991

53

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 1 [1991], Art. 2
54

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JouRNAL

[Vol. 22

StructuralAdjustment Support
This article began with an overview of poverty in the South. Contemporary conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa were singled out and two paradigms
for development were addressed: structuralism, with its emphasis on import
substitution for self-reliant development, and modernization, with its
emphasis on export promotion as the engine for economic growth. I noted
that import substitution informed the policies of most Sub-Saharan African
countries.
The general terms of trade dilemma inherent in traditional North/South
trading patterns, which the precipitous decline in commodity prices over the
last decade is said to reflect, was offered by some as the leading cause for
both Sub-Saharan Africa's persistent underdevelopment and the existing and
widespread balance of payments crises within the countries of in the region.
Others have advanced failed domestic policy regimes, which kept out foreign
capital and competition and distorted the structure of African economies, as
well as inefficient, even corrupt, state bureaucracies as the most important
factors contributing to conditions on the continent.
Not surprisingly, I didn't resolve this debate. Instead I acknowledged that,
whatever the reasons, given the purview of the IMF within the international
financial regime it fell to that institution, joined by the World Bank, to sort
through balance of payments problems as African governments ceased to be
able to borrow from other sources to paper them over. Indeed, such
borrowing as did occur has only contributed to the crisis.
The international institutions in question are effectively controlled by a
North that is disinclined to take a structural view of underdevelopment in the
South. Distortions in the domestic economies, exacerbated by inappropriate
governmental policies, primarily account for balance of payments problems.
I therefore presented a summary discussion of structural adjustment programs
they designed to address these distortions. These IMF/World Banksponsored programs have demanded domestic policy reforms in Sub-Saharan
African countries, including a shift from import substitution to export
promotion, as a condition for the loans necessary to avoid their financial
collapse. As Sub-Saharan African governments have found, "the only way
to get such support is to sing in the free-market choir."27 1 The Bretton
Woods institutions have become receivers for a bankrupt South. 2

271. Pollen & Cockburn, supra note 76, at 226.

272.
In recent years, [African] public administration structures have been increasingly
burdened and dominated on the one hand by the ever-growing concern and
preoccupation with short-term crisis management . . . and on the other, by the
increasing role of foreign experts and managers in national economic decisionmaking in Africa.
With the unending rounds of programme reviews and protracted negotiations on
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I then shifted to a focus on the historical evolution of Europe's relations
with Africa, noting a break with established colonial patterns at the outset
of Lomd I. The requirement for reciprocal trade preferences was dropped
by the EEC in the 1970s as it grew to appreciate its mutual dependance with
former colonies, particularly with respect to ACP strategic commodities.
Even after events made clear that threatened shortages were not to materialize, the EEC has continued its contractual relations with ACP countries,
broadening and deepening its commitments with each subsequent Lomd
convention.
Next, some of Lomd's more important provisions were
examined in detail, pointing out various strengths and weaknesses.
Admittedly the reality of Lom6's impact on ACP development has not lived
up to the vision of its acquis with the ACP countries.
And so I come to my final topic before concluding this article, which
concerns Lom6's newest provisions. The Financial Protocol reserves ECU
1,150m ($1.5755 billion) from the EDF to provide structural adjustment
support to ACP states over the next five years.'
Unlike IMF/World Bank structural adjustment assistance, Lom6 funds for
this purpose are entirely in the form of grants. These grants may be used for
a wide variety of purposes, including sectoral and general import support
programs, grassroot programs, and capital projects and programs. 4
The Community and the ACP States "see the need for urgent action and
share the view that short and medium-term policies must reinforce the longterm development efforts and goals of the ACP states."27 5 Hence, structural adjustment support ought to "improve the social and economic well-being
of the population as a whole" 6 and "ensure that adjustment is economically viable and socially and politically bearable."'"
"[T]he ACP States shall bear primary responsibility for the analysis of the
problems to be solved and the preparation of reform programmes . . .,,"
"[T]he right of the ACP States to determine the direction of their develop279
ment strategies and priorities shall be recognized and respected ....
The ultimate financing decision rests with the Community subject, as

policy adjustments that many an African country has had to undertake . .. as a
precondition for balance of payments support and debt relief, the scope for
independent policy-making and national economic management in Africa has
gradually diminished and narrowed. Policy-making in most of Africa today is
essentially on a short leash.
Glaser, Adjustment, An African Response, The Courier, No. 117, Sept.-Oct., 1989, at 16.
273. These are set out in Lom6 IV, supra note 1, arts. 242 through 250, under the rubric
"Structural Adjustment Support."

274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Lom6
Lomd
Lom6
Lom6
Lom6
Lom6

IV,
IV,
IV,
IV,
IV,
IV,

supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

1, art.
1, art.
1, art.
1, art.
1, art.
1, art.

224.
243.
243(b).
243(g).
244(a).
244(e).
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always, to Lomd mechanisms for consultation and dispute resolution. "All
ACP States shall in principle be eligible for structural adjustment assistance
depending on the scope of the reforms being undertaken or contemplated"'
but "ACP States undertaking reform programmes that are
acknowledged and supported at least by the principal multilateral donors..
. shall be treated as having automatically satisfied the requirements for
adjustment assistance. " "
These Lomd IV excerpts raise a key question: Will Community support
for structural adjustment rise to something more than IMF/World Bank
conditionality? Certainly many in the ACP countries have asked precisely
this question. The Community's response has been an unequivocal "yes,"
though only time will tell whether this proves out in the practice of
administering Lomd IV's provisions.
Manuel Marin, EEC Vice-President and Commissioner for Development,
in a speech delivered at the signing of Lomd IV, made an oblique reference
to IMF/World Bank structural adjustment as he observed that
a number of structural adjustments programmes were not successful or experienced serious difficulties due to political and social
obstacles stemming from an approach which was too rigid and too
focused on purely financial and economic considerations.
Thus the principles on which the new Convention is based require
the process embarked on to be not only economically viable but
socially and politically sustainable.
It is also important for this process to be integrated into the longterm development objectives chosen by the ACP States concerned.
I am confident that our special relations will make a decisive
contribution to the improved conception and implementation of
structural adjustment programmes.
This, in my opinion, is a unique occasion: for the first time there
has been a "North/South Agreement" on the philosophy underlying structural adjustment.m
While negotiating the provisions in Lom6 IV, the Commission's DirectorGeneral for Development, Dieter Frisch

280. Lom6 IV, supra note 1, art. 466-1.
281. Lorn6 IV, supra note 1,art. 346-2.
282. Address of Manuel Marin, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner of Development, transcribed in The Courier, No. 120, Mar.-Apr., 1990, at 8-9.
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promised, with regard to the austerities of the programmes
proposed by the World Bank and IMF, that the Community would

strive to make [structural adjustment] policies differentiated, to
ensure that they took the social dimension into account, were
spread over a longer period and were, to a greater extent than at
present, evolved by the countries concerned. He emphatically
denied that Europe would "simply be dragged behind the chariot
wheels of the World Bank and the IMF."'

The Commission has backed up these promises in the growing number of
contacts they make with IMF/World Bank officials.'

The Commission

coordinates with these institutions "without being at their beck and call."I
It is also significant that in the area of structural adjustment, as in debt,'
the Commission sees itself as a willing moderator in negotiations between an
ACP country and the IMF and World Bank using, in Manuel Marin's words,

the "institutional weight of the European Community."'

283. Dieter Frisch Goes to Bonn and to London, The Courier, No. 113, Jan.-Feb., 1989, at
VII.
284. Michel Camdessus, Executive Director of the IMF, visited the Commission in late 1989,
to discuss Lom6 IV's structural adjustment efforts with Commission officials, particularly the
provisions designed to address the social costs of adjustment. These officials attribute the visit
to the fact that the EEC "is becoming a major actor in discussing sectoral and macro-economic
policies. This needs coordination with other major actors, notably those taking the conditionality
approach." Michel Camdessus, Executive Director of the IMF, at the Commission, The Courier,

No. 118, Nov.-Dec., 1989, at X.
The visit, according to Director-General for Development Dieter Frisch, "is evidence that the
IMF is now considering the social dimension, major development objectives such as food
security, [and] moving away, hopefully, from too stereotyped an approach [to structural
adjustment]." Id.
The Commission has clashed with the IMF over its focus on food self-reliance under Lom6
III. The Commission has taken the position that local producers must be protected from cheap
imports to ensure food security; the IMF has predictably insisted that the market determine
prices. Thus the "Commission supported Niger's imposition of a import tax and compulsory
take-up of local production by licensed importers in order to protect rice-growing projects from
the effects of lower priced imports." Watkins, supra note 17, at 46.
285. Auclert, supra note 134, at 9. Auclert, a former Deputy Director-General for Development, goes on to say that
[EEC-IMF/World Bank] coordination is such that we can influence the decisions.
Because the World Bank people have realised that the Community, with its local
presence and knowledge of local situations, has something to say and is not just a
blinkered technocrat.
Id. In this same interview Auclert claims that the World Bank has inquired about and has copied
EEC procedures for establishing a presence in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. Id.
286. See supra note 255.
287. Main, supra note 56, at 5. He hastens to add that
it mustn't be seen as a fundamental source of antagonism with the Bretton Woods
institutions. Coordination is called for, coordination on reasonable foundations.
Only time can tell what our intended part will be. I want to negotiate permanent
systems of contact with the IMF and the World Bank, so we can do our best
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Structural adjustment is a fact of international economic life for most ACP
countries. The Commission has been sympathetic to, even protective of, the
ACP states undergoing austerity. It recognizes that unique problems in
Africa, such as the absence of a viable private sector or the need to provide
food security or other social goods, militate against the knee-jerk application
of policies designed to pry open African economies. There are heartening
indications that the Commission will continue to support ACP countries

experiencing the process.

CONCLUSION

The Moth and the Flame
Over 25,000 words have here been put to paper, yet terrible truths remain
obscured. In the time that it takes to read all these words many hundreds,
even thousands, will have perished through violence, hunger, pestilence, and
disease. Dwellings razed, the earth brutalized, justice denied, appalling
indignities inflicted, and I daily manage to avoid, rationalize or forget these
terrible truths. The temptation is great to throw up one's hands and get on
with one's life. Only death or denial provides relief from the awesome
consequences of global inequalities.
Still, like a moth to a flame, I am irresistibly drawn to the crisis in the
international economy. What insight I have gained from my study frightens
me. It is useless to those who are suffering. I feel the moth.
Lomd IV's contributions to alleviating international inequality are pitiably
modest and incomplete. What can be admired are those elements in the
convention which contribute to a more just and equitable world order. They
ought to be better publicized so that present and future opinion leaders
become aware of some alternatives to the dominant paradigm in international
economic relations. Utopian or revolutionary musings seem less useful, at
least where one chooses to participate in economic life. One takes one's
inspiration where one can.
There is no perfect solution to global inequality, but there are surely better
and worse ways of living with it. When contrasted with contemporary and
past patterns in North/South relations, the Lom6 acquis, and the ACP/EEC
development cooperation which it has fostered, at least points in the direction
of a better way.

without renouncing what the Community believes to be just, fair and reasonable.
Id. at 5, 6.
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